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Abstract
How can public pension systems be reformed to ensure ﬁscal stability in the face of
increasing life expectancy? To address this pressing open question in public ﬁnance, we
estimate a life-cycle model in which the optimal employment, retirement and consumption
decisions of forward-looking individuals depend, inter alia, on life expectancy and the design
of the public pension system. We calculate that, in the case of Germany, the ﬁscal conse-
quences of the 6.4 year increase in age 65 life expectancy anticipated to occur over the 40
years that separate the 1942 and 1982 birth cohorts can be oﬀset by either an increase of
4.34 years in the full pensionable age or a cut of 37.7% in the per-year value of public pension
beneﬁts. Of these two distinct policy approaches to coping with the ﬁscal consequences of
improving longevity, increasing the full pensionable age generates the largest responses in
labor supply and retirement behavior.
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Over the last several decades the longevity of individuals living in the developed world has im-
proved considerably and consistently, and this trend looks set to continue.1 Such a demographic
change poses numerous social and economic challenges. Notably, many public pension systems,
which are typically compulsory deﬁned beneﬁt schemes, are being strained by the greater pen-
sion demands concurrent higher life expectancy. In response to this problem, an important
political debate has arisen concerning how to reform public pension systems in order to address
the ﬁscal demands being created by improving longevity. This debate has focused on identifying
eﬀective ways of increasing the age-based eligibility requirements associated with public pension
beneﬁts. The policy response thus far has reﬂected this theme: for example, Germany and the
US have recently announced plans to gradually increase the full pensionable age, that is the age
from which an individual may claim a non-reduced public pension, from 65 to 67 years.
In this paper, we contribute to the policy debate on how public pension systems can be re-
formed in order to deal eﬀectively with the consequences for Government ﬁnances of increasing
life expectancy. This is accomplished by specifying and estimating a comprehensive dynamic
structural life-cycle model of employment, retirement and consumption. In our model an indi-
vidual’s optimal behavior depends, inter alia, on life expectancy and the design of the public
pension system. Given the rules that describe optimal behavior, we determine empirically the
behavioral and ﬁscal eﬀects of an increase in life expectancy. Further, drawing on the estimated
model, we explore the consequences of reductions in the generosity of the public pension sys-
tem. In particular, we calculate the increase in the full pensionable age required to oﬀset the
implications for Government ﬁnances of a given increase in life expectancy. Second, and as an
alternative solution to the ﬁscal problems created by improved longevity, we calculate the cut in
the per-year value of public pension beneﬁts which counteracts the ﬁscal consequences for the
Government of the same increase in life expectancy. We compare these two revenue-equivalent
policies and ﬁnd that the increase in the full pensionable age elicits a larger response in indi-
viduals’ employment and retirement behavior, and generates substantially higher expected total
life-time consumption, than does the cut in the per-year value of public pension beneﬁts.
The structural life-cycle model implemented herein is formulated to capture the primary
intertemporal incentives that drive the eﬀects of life expectancy and the public pension system
on individuals’ employment, retirement and consumption decisions. In particular, our model
contains a realistic compulsory public pension system which provides retired individuals with
a pension that reﬂects life-cycle employment and earnings outcomes. We follow, inter alios,
De Nardi et al. (2010), van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2008) and Rust and Phelan (1997) by
allowing an individual’s life-cycle utility to be a function of heterogeneous individual-speciﬁc life
expectancy. Moreover, extending on previous studies, life expectancy in our model is cohort-
speciﬁc and therefore we capture the sizable improvements in life expectancy that have occurred
in recent years. Additional features of the model include opportunities for retirement prior to
the full pensionable age, detailed speciﬁcations of the tax and transfer systems, stochastic job
oﬀers, involuntary separations, saving opportunities and borrowing constraints.
1Oeppen and Vaupel (2002), for example, show that over the last 150 years life expectancy at birth in the
developed world has been increasing at a rate of 2.5 years per decade. The authors further argue that this linear
trend is likely to continue.
1Several previous studies have used structural life-cycle models to investigate the eﬀects of
public pension systems on labor supply, retirement and consumption decisions (see, for example,
Casanova, 2010; French, 2005; French and Jones, forthcoming; Gustman and Steinmeier, 1986,
2005; Heyma, 2004; Jim´ enez-Mart´ ın and Sanchez Mart´ ın, 2007; Rust and Phelan, 1997; van der
Klaauw and Wolpin, 2008). These studies typically ﬁnd that the estimated preference parameters
imply a strong dependence of optimal retirement decisions on the institutional rules that deﬁne
the generosity of public pension beneﬁts. Additionally, a largely separate literature presents
empirical evidence of a direct eﬀect of pension rights on retirement decisions. For example, Blau
(1994), Blundell et al. (2002), Disney and Smith (2002), French and Jones (2010), Friedberg
(2000) and Friedberg and Webb (2005) report micro-level evidence of a link between pension
rights and the timing of retirement, while Bl¨ ondal and Scarpetta (1997) and Gruber and Wise
(1998) demonstrate a similar relationship at the macro level.2 Much of the previous research in
this area has drawn on concerns arising from increasing life expectancy to provide motivation,
however, the focus of the analysis itself has been on understanding the behavioral eﬀects of the
incentives created by public pension systems. A direct link from life expectancy to individual
behavior has therefore been absent. In contrast, this study examines the interplay between
life expectancy, life-cycle employment, retirement and consumption behavior, and the incentives
provided by the public pension system. The breadth of our analysis allows us to move beyond the
previous literature and to address key public pension policy issues concerning the eﬀectiveness
of alterations in the design of public pension systems intended to alleviate the consequences for
Governments’ ﬁnances of increasing life expectancy.
Meanwhile, life-cycle modeling has been used to understand the implications of life ex-
pectancy for critically important yet relatively narrow aspects of behavior, speciﬁcally decisions
related to savings and bequests. Notably, De Nardi et al. (2010) analyze the eﬀect of life ex-
pectancy on the optimal savings decisions of retired individuals and show that an increase in
life expectancy, ceteris paribus, drives individuals to raise asset holdings. Similarly, Gan et al.
(2004) show that savings behavior is consistent with individuals’ subjective beliefs about life
expectancy and Hurd (1989) shows that consumption behavior is sensitive to the mortality rate.
Finally, Brown (2001) demonstrates that individuals account for life expectancy when deciding
whether to annuitize retirement resources. In order to tackle the policy questions central to this
paper, we extend the application of structural life-cycle modeling by using such a framework
to determine the eﬀect of life expectancy on individuals’ optimal employment and retirement
behavior as well as on consumption, and therefore savings, decisions.
We choose to implement our model in the context of Germany. As described by B¨ orsch-
Supan and Schnabel (1998), Germany provides a leading example of a traditional welfare state,
with relatively generous out-of-work transfers, high rates of taxation of earned income and a
substantial compulsory pay-as-you-go public pension system; it is in such a context that issues
surrounding the sustainability of public pension systems tend to be most pressing. Further,
couching the analysis in the context of Germany allows us to exploit a unique pattern of variation
in the evolution of demographic group-speciﬁc life expectancy which arose due to events that
followed German reuniﬁcation in 1990. Speciﬁcally, drawing on variation between demographic
groups in the extent of improvements in life expectancy, we are able to demonstrate that our
2Extensive surveys of this literature are provided by Gruber and Wise (2004) and Gruber and Wise (2007).
2model, together with the estimated parameters, predicts the observed relationship between life
expectancy and individuals’ retirement decisions. This result suggests that our model provides
a sound basis for subsequent counterfactual policy simulations which seek to determine the
eﬀects of improvements in life expectancy on individuals’ optimal employment, retirement and
consumption decisions.
In terms of data sources, we obtain information on life expectancy from the Human Mortal-
ity Database for Germany, which includes projections of age-speciﬁc life expectancies by cohort,
region and gender. This data on life expectancy is combined with a sample of older individuals
taken from the German Socio-Economic Panel and covering the years 1991 - 2007 inclusive.
We estimate the parameters of our model, including preference parameters, parameters appear-
ing in the job oﬀer and involuntary separation probabilities, and parameters describing the
wage oﬀer distribution, using the Method of Simulated Moments as in Gourinchas and Parker
(2002), French (2005) and French and Jones (forthcoming). In addition to replicating the ob-
served relationship between life expectancy and retirement behavior as discussed in the previous
paragraph, the ﬁtted model is able to reproduce further features of our sample including the
distribution of observed wages, the age proﬁle of wealth and the age-speciﬁc rates of transitions
from employment to unemployment and vice versa.
We draw on the estimated model and perform several counterfactual policy simulations,
focusing on the case of Germany. We show that, holding ﬁxed the tax, transfer and pension
systems, the 6.4 year increase in age 65 life expectancy anticipated to occur over the 40 years
that separate the 1942 and 1982 birth cohorts leads individuals approaching the full pensionable
age of 65 years to postpone retirement, increase employment and increase wealth holdings.
Further, this improvement in longevity causes average net Government revenue received from
individuals aged less than the full pensionable age to increase; however, due to higher public
pension demands, the Government’s overall ﬁscal position is worsened substantially. Speciﬁcally,
the increase in life expectancy under consideration leads average net Government revenue per
person, summed over the life-cycle starting at age 40 years and continuing until death, to decrease
by approximately 75000 Euros. We calculate that the full pensionable age must be increased by
4.34 years, from 65 years to 69.34 years, in order to restore the net position of the Government’s
budget. This policy change leads the average age of retirement to increase by approximately
4 years and causes average years of employment prior to retirement to increase by almost as
much. Alternatively, the net position of the Government’s budget can be reinstated via a cut of
37.7% in the per-year value of public pension beneﬁts. Our results show that such a cut in the
per-year value of public pension beneﬁts has little impact on employment or retirement behavior;
in consequence, expected total per-person post age 40 years consumption is over 100000 Euros
higher if instead the ﬁscal consequences for the Government of 40 years worth of improvements
in longevity are counteracted via an increase in the full pensionable age.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines our life-cycle model. Section 3 describes
our data sources. Section 4 provides an overview of the adopted Method of Simulated Moments
estimation methodology and presents our structural parameter estimates. Counterfactual policy
analysis is contained in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
32 Model
2.1 Overview
Herein, we develop a dynamic structural model of individuals’ employment, retirement and
consumption behavior over the life-cycle. We propose a discrete-time ﬁnite-horizon model in
which employment, retirement and consumption decisions are made at quarterly, i.e., three
monthly, intervals. Individuals in employment are assumed to work full-time and this state is
denoted by f.3 Similarly, we use u and r to denote unemployment and retirement respectively.
Individuals are indexed by i = 1,...,N, and age, measured in quarters of a year, is indexed by t.4
The maximum possible age to which an individual can live is denoted by T.5 We formulate our
model such that it describes accurately the incentives facing individuals aged 40 years and over
who reside in single-adult households and who do not have dependent children.6 Henceforth, the
households under study are referred to as single-person households. Our sample selection criteria,
explained below in Section 3.1, ensure that we rely on observations from this demographic group
when estimating the parameters of the model. The older non-retired individuals under study
form a vital demographic group for understanding the implications of public pension reforms.
Indeed, previous work has shown that the labor supply and retirement decisions of older, yet
working age, individuals are relatively elastic with respect to income (for example, Gruber and
Wise, 2004; Haveman et al., 1991; Lalive et al., 2006). These ﬁndings suggest that the eﬀects
of alterations in the generosity of the public pension system will depend predominantly on the
behavioral responses of older non-retired individuals.7
Each period, an individual enjoys a ﬂow of utility which depends on current consumption,
ci;t, current leisure and individual-speciﬁc preference shifters. We use Ui;t(ci;t,f) to denote
individual i’s age t ﬂow utility if he or she is employed. Similarly, the ﬂow utilities associated
with unemployment and retirement are given by Ui;t(ci;t,u) and Ui;t(ci;t,r) respectively. The
ﬂow utilities take the following constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) speciﬁcation
Ui;t(ci;t,j) = βG(ci;t   ci;tηi1[j = f]) + εi;j;t for j = f,u,r, (1)
where G(x) = x1−
1− . In (1), ηi 2 [0,1) describes the degree of complementarity between consump-
tion and leisure. Speciﬁcally, ηi is equal to the share of consumption necessary to compensate
individual i for the disutility of working. We allow heterogeneity in the degree of complementar-
ity between leisure and consumption by assuming that ηijχi  N(µ,σ2
), where χi denotes the
3Given our sample selection criteria, explained below in Section 3.1, only approximately 5% of the population
under study worked fewer than 30 hours per week and therefore it is reasonable to treat all employment as
full-time work.
4To improve readability we do not introduce further subscripts to index speciﬁc cohorts or years: cohort
information is speciﬁc to the individual, and together with age information, the year is thereby deﬁned.
5We follow the life tables and take T to be 110 years.
6We assume that family composition does not change in the future. However, our model is fully applicable to
individuals who have experienced alternative household compositions, speciﬁcally martial status and dependent
children, before entering the sample. Appendix D explains how this is achieved.
7We refrain from extending our analysis to younger households or to multi-adult households as, in both cases,
the incentives created by the tax, transfer and pensions systems are far more complex. Any model of such
household groups is therefore likely to be less exact. Based on a similar justiﬁcation, De Nardi et al. (2010) also
focus on single-person households.
4individual’s observed characteristics at the time of labor market entry. In order to guarantee
that ηi 2 [0,1) we truncate ηi from above at 0.999 and from below at zero. The parameter ρ
represents the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion and may take any weakly positive value except
unity. In our speciﬁcation, ρ = 0 corresponds to risk neutrality and strictly positive values of
ρ imply risk aversion. The unobservables εi;f;t, εi;u;t and εi;r;t represent transient individual-
speciﬁc preference shifters while the parameter β determines the importance of consumption
and leisure in preferences, relative to the transient individual-speciﬁc unobservables.8
Current consumption is the sum of current net income and current dissaving. Current net
income, in turn, depends on the individual’s gross incomes from employment and from interest
on wealth, and on the contemporaneous tax, transfer and pension systems. The public pension
system determines the value of any pension income that a retired individual receives from the
State as well as the rules concerning eligibility to receive public pension beneﬁts. The tax system
determines the extent of any deductions from gross income, including income tax payments and
Social Security Contributions. The transfer system, meanwhile, controls the generosity of out-
of-work transfers. Our model includes the two leading forms of out-of-work transfers, namely,
Social Assistance and Unemployment Insurance.
Individuals are forward-looking and each period make employment, retirement and consump-
tion decisions in order to maximize the discounted expected value of future utility. Retirement
is treated as an absorbing state; a retired individual cannot make a transition into employment







In the above di;t 2 ff,u,rg is a categorial variable which codes the individual’s age t labor supply
and retirement behavior. The variable d details the individual’s employment and retirement
behavior in each remaining period of the individual’s life. Similarly, c denotes the individual’s
consumption choice in each remaining period of the individual’s life. The operator Et is an
expectation conditional on the individual’s age t information set. In this set-up, payoﬀs occurring
in the future are discounted due to: (i) subjective time discounting; and (ii) mortality risk. The
variable δ 2 [0,1] denotes the individual’s subjective time discount factor. Meanwhile, ki;s;t is
the probability of the individual surviving until age s conditional on being aged t.
The collection of individual-speciﬁc survival rates over the whole life-cycle, fki;t+0:25;tgT−0:25
t=1 ,
deﬁnes the individual’s life expectancy at each age. The inclusion of the individual-speciﬁc
survival probabilities in the individual’s objective function therefore reﬂects the dependence
of the individual’s life-cycle utility on life expectancy. We follow, inter alios, De Nardi et al.
(2010), van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2008) and Rust and Phelan (1997) and allow heterogeneity
in life expectancy. Speciﬁcally, we allow variation in survival rates, and therefore life expectancy,
according to gender and region of residence. Further, and in addition to the related literature, we
8The "s are assumed to occur independently over individuals. The "s for individual i are assumed to occur
independently over time and over the labor market states j = f;u;r. Further, the individual’s age t "s are assumed
to be independent of the individual’s age t observed characteristics. Additionally, "i;j;t for all i, j and t is assumed
to have a type I extreme value distribution. The inclusion of this form of unobservable in the ﬂow utilities has
the eﬀect of smoothing the value function and thus facilitates estimation of the structural parameters.
9This assumption is in line with the German legislation and is strongly supported by the data.
5allow for improvements in life expectancy over cohorts. Section 3.2 below discusses the empirical
relevance and statistical advantages associated with our relatively rich approach to modeling life
expectancy. The optimization process is subject to an intertemporal budget constraint. In
addition, behavior is subject to constraints on borrowing and on the availability of employment
opportunities.
In this setting, forward-looking optimizing behavior on the part of the individual implies that
employment and consumption decisions prior to retirement, as well as the timing of retirement
itself, depend, inter alia, on life expectancy and the public pension system. Below we discuss
our life-cycle model in more detail. We describe in turn: (i) the processes that determine job
oﬀers and involuntary separations and thereby dictate employment opportunities; (ii) the com-
position of gross wage income; (iii) the per-period net income arising from each of employment,
unemployment and retirement; (iv) borrowing constraints, consumption possibilities and the
intertemporal budget constraint; and (v) the optimal arrangement of employment, retirement
and consumption over the life-cycle.
2.2 Employment Opportunities
An individual’s behavior is constrained by the availability of employment opportunities. We
model such constraints as follows. Each period an individual who was unemployed in the previous
period receives a job oﬀer with probability Θi;t. Upon receiving a job oﬀer, the individual
observes the current gross wage, wi;t, associated with the job opportunity. The age t job oﬀer
probability takes the form
Θi;t = Φ(λxi;t + µ
i ). (3)
Here and henceforth Φ() denotes the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal
random variable. We allow the job oﬀer probability to depend on age, region of residence and
health status, and variables measuring these characteristics are included in xi;t. λ is a suitably
dimensioned parameter vector. Finally, µ
i represents unobserved individual characteristics that
impact on the job oﬀer probability. Further details concerning µ
i are provided at the end of
this subsection. An individual in receipt of a job oﬀer has the option of moving into employment
in the current period. With probability (1   Θi;t) a previously unemployed individual does not
receive a job oﬀer at age t. In such a case a transition into employment is impossible in the
current period.
Similarly, each period an individual who was employed in the previous period experiences an
involuntary separation with probability Γi;t. The age t probability of an involuntary separation
takes the form
Γi;t = Φ(λ xi;t + µ 
i ), (4)
where λ  is a suitably dimensioned parameter vector and µ 
i is an unobserved individual ef-
fect which we describe at the end of this subsection. An individual subject to an involuntary
separation does not have the option of remaining in employment in the current period. With
probability (1   Γi;t) a previously employed individual does not experience an involuntary sep-
aration and thus has the opportunity to stay in employment in the current period. Such an
individual receives a new gross wage oﬀer of wi;t.
6The unobserved individual eﬀects appearing in the job oﬀer and involuntary separation
probabilities are interpreted as permanent unobserved individual characteristics that impact on
an individual’s ability to ﬁnd or keep a job. These unobservables are assumed to be assigned to
an individual when he or she ﬁrst enters the labor market. Further, we posit the following joint
distribution for the unobserved individual eﬀects that appear in the job oﬀer and involuntary
separation probabilities: [µ
i ,µ 
i ]jχi  N(0,Σ) where, as above, χi denotes the individual’s
observed characteristics at the time of labor market entry.
2.3 Gross Wage Income
For an individual who accepts employment, current period gross wage income takes the form
of the gross hourly wage associated the current job oﬀer, wi;t, multiplied by usual hours of
work.10 As gross wage income provides the basis for most components of current and future
ﬁnancial incentives we adopt a rich speciﬁcation of gross wages. Speciﬁcally, individual i’s log
gross oﬀered wage is assumed to be composed as follows
log(wi;t) = λzi;t + αi + τi;t + υi;t. (5)
In the above zi;t are observed individual characteristics that aﬀect wages including education,
region of residence and experience, and λ is a suitably dimensioned parameter vector. The
inclusion of experience is important here because it captures the endogenous accumulation of
experience-based human capital as in, for example, Eckstein and Wolpin (1989). The ﬁnal
three terms in the wage equation are the unobserved components of wages: αi is a permanent
individual-speciﬁc random eﬀect, representing ability or skills; τi;t is a persistent unobservable,
which we interpret as an employer-employee match-speciﬁc productivity eﬀect; and υi;t is a
transitory wage shock.
We now outline the assumed distributions of each of the three unobserved components of
gross oﬀered wages. The permanent unobservable αi is assigned to an individual when he or
she ﬁrst enters the labor market. We assume αijχi  N(0,σ2
). The persistent unobservable
τi;t, representing match-speciﬁc productivity, evolves as follows. For an individual who was
employed in the previous period, τi;t keeps the same value as in the previous period with prob-
ability Π. However, with probability (1   Π) a previously employed individual’s match-speciﬁc
productivity is subject to a shock. In such a case, the individual receives a new match-speciﬁc
productive eﬀect drawn from the following distribution: τi;tjφi;t  N(0,σ2
) where φi;t denotes
the individual’s age t characteristics, including previous labor market outcomes and previous
unobserved characteristics. We thus interpret Π as the probability of an employed individual’s
match-speciﬁc component of productivity persisting into the next period. An individual who was
unemployed in the previous period and who is in receipt of a job oﬀer in the current period also
receives a new match-speciﬁc productivity shock distributed as follows: τi;tjφi;t  N(0,σ2
).11
10We assume that employment takes the form of 39 hours of work per week. This corresponds to the average
weekly hours of work of the employed individuals in our sample.
11We note that, in contrast to Low et al. (2010), we do not model, or attempt to observe, transitions between
employers. Therefore, we identify the parameters Π and 
2
 purely from individual-speciﬁc wage observations.
7Finally, concerning the transitory wage shock, we assume υi;tjφi;t  N(0,σ2
).12
2.4 Net Income
We now describe how the tax, transfer and pension systems combine with an individual’s labor
market status to determine the individual’s net income. We restrict our discussion to those
institutional features that impact on the ﬁnancial incentives facing members of the demographic
group under study, speciﬁcally older working-age individuals residing in single-person house-
holds. As justiﬁed previously, our analysis focuses on Germany. Immediately below we indicate
how our model captures the German institutional environment. Appendix A, meanwhile, pro-
vides further details concerning the German tax, transfer and pension systems in the years
covered by our sample, that is 1991 - 2007.13
2.4.1 Net Income if Employed
An employed individual receives a gross income equal to the total value of gross wage income,
as described above in Section 2.3, and interest income from wealth, with the latter being equal
to the real interest rate times the value of the individual’s stock of wealth.14 The net income
received by an employed individual aged t, mi;f;t, is computed by applying to gross income the
appropriate deductions for Social Security Contributions and income tax.
Social Security Contributions are made for health, pension and Unemployment Insurance
beneﬁts and are obligatory. Social Security Contributions are payable at a constant rate on all
gross wage income above a disregard and below an earnings cap. Social Security Contributions
are not payable on any gross wage income in excess of the earnings cap. In addition to the
employee’s Social Security Contributions, the employer pays the same amount in Social Security
Contributions.15 Income tax is payable on the entirety of an individual’s taxable income. Tax-
able income, in turn, consists of any gross income in excess of the sum of the universal tax-free
allowance and permissable Social Security Contributions.16 Income tax is payable at a rate that
is increasing in the individual’s taxable income.17
12Additionally, at all ages, the three unobserved components of wages are assumed to be mutually independent




i ] that aﬀect the job oﬀer and involuntary separation probabilities.
13During the sample period, the German tax, transfer and pension systems were subject to several reforms. We
take current net income to be a function of the contemporaneous tax, transfer and pension systems. We therefore
account for the eﬀects of tax, transfer and pension reforms on static current-period incentives. We assume that
individuals expect that the current tax and transfer systems will persist into future years. This assumption is
plausible as either the reforms to the tax and transfer systems that occurred during the sample period were
announced at short notice or the time schedule for their implementation was highly uncertain. We also assume
that individuals expect that the cohort-speciﬁc rules which deﬁne the public pension system will be maintained
indeﬁnitely. In Appendix A.2.4 we argue that the nature of the public pension reforms that occurred during the
sample period was such that this assumption is realistic.
14Our analysis follows French and Jones (forthcoming) and assumes an annualized real interest rate of 3%.
15Since July 2005 there has been a small divergence from this rule which we neglect in this study.
16The value of Social Security Contributions that can be set against gross income when computing taxable
income is subject to a maximum limit.
17We note here two further features of income tax that apply irrespective of an individual’s labor market status.
First, only interest income from wealth in excess of a disregard counts towards taxable income. Second, there
exists a Solidarity tax which was introduced in order to ﬁnance the cost of German reuniﬁcation. The Solidarity
tax is proportional to an individual’s income tax liability. Currently, there is no indication that the Solidarity tax
will be phased out.
82.4.2 Net Income if Unemployed
An unemployed individual receives a gross income equal to the value of interest income from
wealth. The net income received by an unemployed individual aged t, mi;u;t, is computed by
adding to gross income any transfer payments from the Government and applying the appropri-
ate deduction for income tax. Government-provided transfers to unemployed individuals take
two forms: Means-tested Social Assistance beneﬁts which ensure a universal minimum income,
irrespective of the individual’s employment or earnings history; and Unemployment Insurance
beneﬁts which provide an unemployed individual with a fraction of his or her previous net earn-
ings. Social Assistance beneﬁts are paid indeﬁnitely while Unemployment Insurance beneﬁts are
paid for an entitlement period which is determined by an individual’s age and recent employment
history. Social Assistance beneﬁts have no tax implications. Unemployment Insurance beneﬁts
are not directly taxed. Instead, Unemployment Insurance beneﬁts are added to interest income
and the individual’s average tax rate is determined based on the same tax schedule as applica-
ble to employed individuals (see Section 2.4.1). The individual’s tax liability is determined by
applying the individual-speciﬁc average tax rate to interest income.
2.4.3 Net Income if Retired
A retired individual receives a gross income equal to the value of public pension beneﬁts plus
any interest income from wealth. The net income of a retired individual aged t, mi;r;t, is equal
to gross income less income tax and plus any Government-mandated transfers. The sum of
interest income from wealth and 30% of public pension beneﬁts, less the tax-free allowance,
is subject to income tax.18 Given taxable income, a retired individual’s income tax liability
is calculated using the same formula as applicable to employed individuals (see Section 2.4.1).
Pensioners are eligible to receive a non-taxable means-tested transfer similar in generosity to
Social Assistance.19
In the current setting, public pension beneﬁts provide a major source of income for retired
individuals.20 We embed within our model the most important aspects of the German public
pension system. In this subsection, we provide an overview of the relevant institutional rules. In
line with many public pension systems, German public pension beneﬁts reﬂect an individual’s
employment and earnings outcomes at all ages prior to retirement. Speciﬁcally, public pension
beneﬁts are linked to an individual’s labor market history via a quantity we refer to as “weighted
pension points”. An individual accumulates one pension point for every year of employment and
18Until the year 2004, approximately 30% of public pension income was subject to income tax. Following a
reform in 2004, Social Security Contributions for public pension beneﬁts have been subject to gradually increasing
taxation, while public pension beneﬁts have seen a corresponding increase in tax exemption. It is anticipated that
by 2040 all public pension income will be tax exempt. The design of this reform is such that life-cycle income
is not systematically aﬀected. Therefore, in our modeling, we reasonably assume throughout that 30% of public
pension income is subject to income tax.
19The exact form of this transfer has varied over the years but has never diﬀered substantially from Social
Assistance.
20B¨ orsch-Supan and Wilke (2004) note that the ﬁrst pillar pension system, or public pension system, in Germany
accounts for approximately 85% of total pension income. Individual and occupational pensions, meanwhile,
account for 10% and 5% of pension income respectively. Given the relatively small share of pension income
provided by individual and occupational pensions, we refrain from explicitly modeling these schemes. Instead,
we assume that the provision for private saving aﬀorded by our model (see Section 2.5) approximates the saving
opportunities oﬀered by individual and occupational pension plans.
9such pension points attract a weight of minfwi;t/wi;t,Maxi;tg, where wi;t denotes the mean gross
wage in the period when individual i is age t and Maxi;t denotes the year-speciﬁc cap on pension
point weights. During the sample period, the cap on pension point weights varied slightly but
was roughly equal to two in all years.21 Consequently, for an employed individual earning less
than approximately double the current mean gross wage, pension points are weighted by the
ratio of the individual’s current gross wage to the current mean gross wage, while individuals
earning more than approximately double the current mean gross wage are allocated a pension
point weight of roughly two. An individual also accumulates one pension point for every year of
Unemployment Insurance eligible unemployment.22 Such pension points are allocated a weight
of minf0.8  wi;t′/wi;t,0.8  Maxi;tg, where t′ denotes the age at which the individual was last
employed. Thus, up to a cap of roughly 1.6, an unemployed individual’s pension points are
weighed by the ratio of 80% of the individual’s most recent gross wage relative to the current
mean gross wage.23
The full pensionable age applicable to the individuals under study is 65 years.24 At this
age, an individual can retire and receive a publicly provided pension with a value proportional
to the sum of the individual’s weighted pension points accumulated prior to age 65 years. The
proportionality factor is a year-speciﬁc ﬁgure that diﬀers between east and west Germany (see
Appendix A.2.1). The German public pension system is relatively generous. Speciﬁcally, ac-
cording to B¨ orsch-Supan and Schnabel (1998), in 1998 public pension beneﬁts provided a re-
placement rate of around 70% of pre-retirement net earnings for an individual retiring at the
full pensionable age with 45 years of working experience and average life-time earnings.
The German public pension system provides numerous opportunities for individuals to enter
retirement prior to the full pensionable age and our model captures most important routes
into early retirement. Speciﬁcally, our model recognizes that an individual may be eligible for
retirement prior to the full pensionable age on the grounds of: (i) gender, speciﬁcally being a
woman; (ii) disability; or (iii) working history, speciﬁcally having previously worked at least
35 years. It should be noted that eligibility for early retirement on the grounds of gender or
working history depends on the individual’s age; for example, those who have worked at least 35
years may retire only from age 63 years. The age, gender and working history based eligibility
criteria for retirement prior to the full pensionable age are entirely objective and we hard-code
the relevant rules into our model. When doing this, we account fully for variation over time in
the eligibility criteria for early retirement. See Appendix A.2.3 for a description of the early
retirement eligibility criteria.
In contrast, the rules that determine eligibility for public pension beneﬁts on the grounds of
disability are complex and the operationalization of these rules has inevitably been somewhat
21Before the computation of the weight attached to an individual’s pension points, the wages of east Germans
are subject to an adjustment. Appendix A.2.1 provides further details.
22Prior to 2006, unemployed individuals who were ineligible for Unemployment Insurance accumulated pension
points which received a very small weight, speciﬁcally, 0.0834. Since 2006, unemployed individuals who are
ineligible for Unemployment Insurance have been unable to accumulate pension points.
23Appendix A.2.2 discusses further routes by which individuals can accumulate pension points.
24In fact, this is a minor simpliﬁcation. In 2007, the last year covered by our sample, the German parliament
voted to increase gradually the full pensionable age to 67 years for individuals born after 1963. This reform
aﬀected just a handful of the (relatively young) individuals in our sample, and only in the second half of 2007.
Thus, in our analysis we assume a full pensionable age of 65 years for all sample members.
10subjective. For the purpose of implementing our model, we assume that individual i has a
probability Υi;t of being eligible, due to disability, for early retirement. The age t probability of
being eligible for public pension beneﬁts on the grounds of disability is as follows
Υi;t = Φ(λqi;t), (6)
where qi;t contains variables that measure the individual’s gender and health status, and λ is
a suitably dimensioned parameter vector.
Individuals who retire before the full pensionable age may receive a “non-reduced public
pension”, the value of which is obtained by multiplying the individual’s weighted pension points
accumulated at the time of retirement by the same proportionality factor as used to determine the
value of public pension beneﬁts for individuals retiring at the full pensionable age. Alternatively,
depending on the year-speciﬁc rules and on gender, disability status, working history and age, an
individual’s public pension beneﬁts may be subject to adjustments. Appendix A.2.3 details the
rules that determine the nature of any adjustments to the value of the public pension beneﬁts
received by early retirees.
2.5 Borrowing, Consumption and the Intertemporal Budget Constraint
The value of the stock of individual i’s wealth at age t is denoted by Wi;t. Here and henceforth,
wealth is taken to refer to an individual’s private wealth holdings, and therefore excludes the
value of any entitlements to the public pension or other social programs. The individual faces
borrowing constraints which restrict wealth to being non-negative and therefore we have
Wi;t  0. (7)
This assumption, which follows French (2005) and Low et al. (2010), reﬂects that borrowing
typically requires collateral and that individuals are unable to borrow against future earnings
or future Unemployment Insurance, Social Assistance or public pension beneﬁts. Subject to the
above-described borrowing constraint, each period, a non-retired individual chooses a consump-
tion level, ci;t. Thus, we have the following intertemporal budget constraint which describes
quarter-by-quarter wealth accumulation for a non-retired individual
Wi;t+0:25 = Wi;t + 1(di;t = f)mi;f;t + 1(di;t = u)mi;u;t   ci;t. (8)
Note that, given consumption behavior, wealth accumulation depends on the real interest as the
net incomes mi;f;t and mi;u;t include the net of tax value of any interest income from wealth.25
We assume that a retired individual consumes out of accumulated wealth at a level consistent
with the actuarially fair annuity value of his or her stock of wealth at the date of retirement.
The per-period consumption enjoyed by an individual who retires at age t thus given by
ci;t = mi;r;t + ai;t, (9)
25In contrast to the models of retirement behavior developed by, for example, French and Jones (forthcoming)
and Rust and Phelan (1997), we do not include medical expenses. This is reasonable given that we implement
the model in the context of Germany, which has a universal health care system.
11where ai;t denotes per-period annuity value of wealth for an individual who retires at age t.
This modeling assumption greatly simpliﬁes the complex process of consumption determination
among the retired population. However, this speciﬁcation captures the primary intertemporal
incentives that are important for the current application. In particular, our modeling approach
recognizes that: (i) wealth accumulation prior to retirement is valuable in retirement; (ii) the
value of accumulated wealth is negatively related to life expectancy, as the actuarially fair
annuity value of wealth depends negatively on life expectancy; and (iii) ﬁnancing consumption
out of accumulated wealth is a substitute for funding consumption from public pension beneﬁts.
2.6 Optimal Labor Supply, Retirement and Consumption
Drawing on dynamic programming techniques, we use our model to describe an individual’s
optimal employment, retirement and consumption behavior over the life-cycle. An individual’s
age t optimization problem can be expressed in terms of the state-speciﬁc value functions V
j
t (ci;t)
for j = f,u,r, which deﬁne the maximized discounted expected value of the individual’s future
life-cycle utility conditional on currently being in state j with consumption ci;t. Using ˇ t to denote
the individual’s age in the next quarter, i.e., ˇ t  t + 0.25, the state-speciﬁc value functions are
deﬁned recursively as follows
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In (10)-(12) above, Λi; t is the individual’s probability of being eligible for retirement at age ˇ t.26
Meanwhile, V
f
i; t and V u
i; t are deﬁned as the age ˇ t value functions associated with age ˇ t employment
and unemployment, respectively, after age ˇ t consumption has been optimized. Speciﬁcally,
V
j




i; t(ci; t) for j = f,u. (14)
Subject to the above discussed constraints on the availability of employment opportuni-
ties and on wealth accumulation, each period, an individual is able to adjust his or her em-
ployment, retirement and consumption behavior. At age t, a forward-looking optimizing in-
26Following the discussion above in Section 2.4.3, an individual may be eligible for retirement at age ˇ t either
on the grounds of disability, an event which occurs with probability Υi; t as deﬁned above in equation (6), or due
to having satisﬁed the relevant age, gender and working history based criteria. Therefore, the probability of an
age ˇ t individual being eligible for retirement, Λi; t, takes the following form:
Λi; t =
{
1 if age, gender and working history based criteria for retirement eligibility are satisﬁed;
Υi; t otherwise:
(13)
Finally, all individuals may retire at the full pensionable age of 65 years and therefore we have Λi;65 = 1.
12dividual in possession of a job oﬀer but not eligible for retirement will choose employment
and a current-period consumption level of c′










i;t) > maxci;t V u
i;t(ci;t), and otherwise will choose to be unemployed and to consume
ci;t = maxci;t V u
i;t(ci;t). If such an individual instead is eligible for retirement then he or she will
choose employment and a current-period consumption level of c′
i;t if, in addition to the previous
two inequalities, it is also the case that V
f
i;t(c′
i;t) > V r
i;t. An individual who does not have a job
oﬀer and is not eligible early retirement will be unemployed with a current-period consumption
level of ci;t = maxci;t V u
i;t(ci;t). Alternatively, if this individual is eligible for retirement then he
or she will choose unemployment with a current-period consumption level of c′





i;t(ci;t) and V u
i;t(c′
i;t) > V r
i;t. Upon reaching the full pensionable age all
remaining non-retired individuals must enter retirement.
In this setting there are several mechanisms linking an individual’s current employment, re-
tirement and consumption decisions with expected future payoﬀs. Focusing on those intertem-
poral linkages directly related to retirement, we note that employment in the current period
adds to an individual’s stock of pension points. Current employment therefore, ceteris paribus,
increases income in the event of retirement. Current period unemployment has a similar albeit
smaller eﬀect, provided that the unemployed individual is receiving Unemployment Insurance
beneﬁts. Furthermore, working in the current period adds to the individual’s experience which,
assuming positive wage returns to experience, leads to higher expected future wage oﬀers and,
ceteris paribus, to higher public pension beneﬁts in retirement.27 Finally, and perhaps most
transparently, accumulation of wealth prior to retirement, ceteris paribus, allows an individual
to increase income in retirement.
Life expectancy interacts with the above-described intertemporal dependencies. We discuss
here two of the incentive eﬀects created by an increase in life expectancy, reﬂected in our model
by an appropriate adjustment of the individual-speciﬁc survival probabilities, fki;t+0:25;tgT−0:25
t=1 .
First, an increase in life expectancy increases the expected duration over which an individual
will receive the publicly provided pension. In consequence, an increase in longevity, ceteris
paribus, raises the expected future returns to the accumulation of pension points, and thus
creates an incentive to postpone retirement. Second, an increase in life expectancy increases the
time over which an individual may enjoy the returns from accumulated wealth. Ceteris paribus,
the incentive to save is therefore increasing in life expectancy. However, the total eﬀect of an
increase in life expectancy on behavior over the life-cycle is, a priori, impossible to determine.
Indeed, since savings and entitlements to public pension beneﬁts are substitutes in terms of
their eﬀects on utility in retirement, individuals may rationally choose to respond to an increase
in life expectancy by increasing employment and reducing wealth accumulation, or vice versa.
Moreover, an increase in life expectancy may lead to higher saving or increased employment
early in the life-cycle followed by earlier retirement.28
27Intertemporal linkages also occur through Unemployment Insurance beneﬁts: employment increases the du-
ration of entitlement to Unemployment Insurance in future periods, and wage based rewards arising from human
capital accumulation mean that current employment leads to higher Unemployment Insurance beneﬁts in the case
of future unemployment. See Haan and Prowse (2010) for further discussion.
28Optimizing behavior over the life-cycle does, however, rule out an increase in life expectancy causing weakly
lower saving and weakly higher unemployment early in the life-cycle followed by strictly earlier retirement.
133 Data Sources and Sample Selection
In order to estimate the parameters of the above-described model we draw on data from the
German Socio-Economic Panel and the Human Mortality Database.
3.1 German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP)
The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) is an annual, representative panel survey of over
11000 households in Germany. The SOEP contains information about socio-economic variables,
including income and working behavior, at the individual and household levels.29 We use the
annual SOEP surveys from the years 1992 - 2008 inclusive, which contain retrospective infor-
mation covering the ﬁscal years 1991 - 2007.30 Behavior is analyzed on a quarterly, i.e., 3
monthly, basis.31 We construct an unbalanced panel of individuals who: (i) are aged 40-65 years
inclusive; (ii) are living in single-adult households; and (iii) do not have dependent children.32
Furthermore, we exclude individuals whose primary earnings are from self-employment as well
as those in full-time education because, in both cases, labor supply behavior diﬀers substantially
from that of the rest of the population of interest. These exclusions yield a sample with 40409
person-quarter observations corresponding to 2389 diﬀerent single individuals of whom 1302 are
women and 1087 men. The median number of observations per individual is 11 quarters and
around 25% of the individuals are observed for 5 or more years.
The SOEP data set contains detailed information about individuals’ employment and retire-
ment behavior in each month. We group the monthly information and form quarterly obser-
vations with an individual’s labor market state in the ﬁrst month of the quarter determining
the quarterly outcome. We distinguish between employment, assumed to be full-time work,
unemployment and retirement. Individuals who report suﬃcient income from pensions are clas-
siﬁed as retired. A measure of experience at the time that the individual entered the sample
is constructed from retrospective information concerning the individual’s working history. This
variable is then updated at quarterly intervals over the sample period in accordance with the
individual’s observed employment behavior. In line with the relevant legislation during the
observation period, all remaining non-retired individuals are reclassiﬁed as retired at age 65
years.
Figure 1 shows the shares of employment, unemployment and retirement by age separately
for men and women and by region of residence, i.e., east or west Germany, averaged over the
observation period. In general, the behavior of the various subgroups is similar. Early retirement
among individuals in their 40s or early to mid 50s is rare. However, early retirement is much
more common for individuals in their late 50s and early 60s. Indeed, at age 60 years, 40% of
individuals are in early retirement and more than 80% of individuals enter retirement before the
full pensionable age of 65 years. Employment rates for men and women are quite similar. This is
not surprising since our sample consists only of single-person households. However, as expected,
we ﬁnd large diﬀerences in employment and retirement behavior according to region of residence:
29Wagner et al. (2007) provide an overview of the SOEP.
30The German ﬁscal year commences on 1
st January.
31This level of disaggregation allows us to model accurately the Unemployment Insurance system.
32These sample selection criteria complement the structural model presented in Section 2.






































































































averaged over the whole age distribution, the employment rate is about 10 percentage points
higher in west Germany than in the east, and older east Germans have a higher propensity to
retire than west Germans of the same age. These diﬀerences are likely to be related to the
relatively poor economic conditions in east Germany.
The SOEP data set includes individuals’ gross earnings in the month prior to the interview
date. Using the corresponding working hours, including hours of payed overtime work, we
construct an hourly wage measure. We follow Fuchs-Schuendeln and Schuendeln (2005) and
construct a measure of individual-level wealth based on the yearly ﬁnancial information available
in the SOEP. Speciﬁcally, an individual’s wealth is deﬁned as the sum of non-property wealth,
computed from capital income assuming a real rate of return of 3%, and net property equity.
We convert wealth and wages into year 2000 prices using the Retail Price Index. In our sample,
the average gross hourly wage is 15.65 Euros and average individual wealth is 40037 Euros.
3.2 Human Mortality Database (HMD)
We obtain information about longevity in Germany from the relevant life tables in the Human
Mortality Database (HMD).33 The life tables include survival probabilities and life expectancies
that vary by age, birth cohort, region of residence (east or west Germany) and gender and
are available for the years 1991 - 2007. Based on the information in the HMD, we assign a
demographic group-speciﬁc and cohort-speciﬁc survival probability and life expectancy to each
33Human Mortality Database is provided by the University of California, Berkeley (USA) and Max Planck
Institute for Demographic Research (Germany). The database is available at www.mortality.org.
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observation in our SOEP sample.34
Figure 2 shows the evolution over time of life expectancy at age 40 years for east and
west German men and women. As expected, we observe longer life expectancies for women
and, irrespective of gender or region, an upward trend in life expectancy over time. As well
documented in the demographic literature, e.g., Gjon¸ ca et al. (2000), life expectancy in east
Germany in 1991, immediately after German reuniﬁcation, was considerably lower than in west
Germany: in 1991 a 40 year old east German man expected to live 2.7 years less than his west
German counterpart, and the corresponding diﬀerence for women was 2.4 years. More important
for our purposes are the diﬀerent time trends by gender and region: between 1991 and 2007,
there was a strong east-west convergence in life expectancy for women and moderate east-west
convergence for men. Speciﬁcally, by 2003 there was hardly any east-west diﬀerence in life
expectancy for women and by 2007 the east-west life expectancy gap for men had fallen to one
year. According to Gjon¸ ca et al. (2000), Nolte et al. (2002) and Kibele and Scholz (2008), the
leading reason for this convergence was improvements in the medical system in east Germany.
In light of the above documented heterogeneity in life expectancy, in the empirical implemen-
tation of our structural life-cycle model we permit variation in life expectancy according to age,
birth cohort, gender and region of residence. This maximizes the model’s accuracy. Further-
more, by drawing on variation between demographic groups in the extent of improvements in life
expectancy over time, we are able to estimate the relationship between life expectancy and retire-
ment decisions, controlling for age, time and cohort eﬀects. This quantity is informative about
the extent to which individuals condition behavior on objectively measured life expectancy. As
a powerful in-sample goodness of ﬁt test, we compare the relationship between life expectancy
and retirement decisions as implied by our estimation results with the corresponding quantity
observed in our sample.35
34The HMD does not contain information about marital status. In general, the life expectancy of single
individuals tends to be lower than that of married individuals. This may lead our estimate of the subjective time
discount factor to be biased downwards. However, we are not concerned about this issue as there is evidence the
relationship between life expectancy and marital status is strongest for prime-age individuals and is weak, or even
nonexistent, for older individuals (see Johnson et al., 2000). Moreover, it is likely that individuals are less well
informed about the relationship between life expectancy and marital status than they are about variation in life
expectancy according to gender, region or birth cohort.
35In diﬀerent settings, Alesina and Fuchs-Schuendeln (2007), Fuchs-Schuendeln (2008) and Fuchs-Schuendeln
and Schuendeln (2005) also exploit variation generated by German reuniﬁcation.
164 Estimation Strategy and Results
4.1 Method of Simulated Moments Estimation Method and Identiﬁcation
As in Gourinchas and Parker (2002), French (2005) and French and Jones (forthcoming), we
estimate the parameters of our model using the Method of Simulated Moments (MSM): parame-
ters are chosen to minimize the distance between a set of moments pertaining to the values of the
endogenous variables, namely wages, wealth levels, and employment and retirement outcomes,
as observed in our sample and the average values of the same moments in a number of simulated
data sets. The construction of each simulated data set starts with the empirical distribution
of the exogenous individual characteristics, such as gender, education and region of residence,
observed in our sample. Given a trial parameter vector θt, we draw on a reduced form model
in order to simulate the initial values of the endogeneous variables. We then use the above-
described structural model as the basis for simulating wage oﬀers and employment, retirement
and consumption outcomes in subsequent quarters of the sample period. When simulating data
sets, the value function is approximated using the method described in Appendix B.
Suppose that a total of p moments are used in the MSM estimation. Let Mo denote the
p-by-1-dimensional vector of moments constructed from our sample observations. Further, let
Ms
k(θt) denote the same vector of moments constructed using the kth simulated sample obtained
using the parameter vector θt. The MSM parameter estimates are deﬁned to be the value of θt
that minimizes the weighted quadratic distance (M
s(θt)   Mo)′W(M
s(θt)   Mo), where W is
a ﬁxed p-by-p-dimensional positive semideﬁnite weighting matrix and M
s(θt) denotes the value
of the vector of simulated moments averaged over K simulated data sets, each obtained using
the parameter vector θt.36 Under the conditions stated in Pakes and Pollard (1989), the MSM
estimator is consistent and asymptotically normally distributed.
Our estimation procedure uses 265 moments and we estimate 82 parameters. In Appendix C
we provide a detailed description of the chosen moments together with information about which
parameters are primarily identiﬁed by each set of moments. However, we highlight here that the
subjective time discount factor, δ, and the utility curvature parameter, ρ, are identiﬁed from
information on wealth holdings and saving behavior according to age. In more detail, infor-
mation on the average wealth holdings is suﬃcient to identify either δ or ρ, while variation in
wealth according to age allows us to identify both of these parameters. Coeﬃcient estimates
obtained from Ordinary Least Squared (OLS) regressions of wages and transitions between labor
market states on demographic variables provide moments that identify the eﬀects of observed
individual characteristics on wages, job oﬀers and involuntary separations. Meanwhile, moments
that describe the persistence in wages and in employment outcomes provide identifying infor-
mation about the parameters appearing in the distributions of the permanent and persistent
unobservables.
We now explain our strategy for accounting for selectivity in the sample wage observations.
36For the purpose of estimation, we set K = 5. We thus simulate the employment, retirement and consumption
decisions of around 12000 hypothetical individuals in a total of approximately 200000 time periods. Employing
the optimal weighting matrix, that is the inverse covariance matrix of the chosen moments, can lead to small
sample bias (see Altonji and Segal, 1996). Therefore, we use a diagonal weighting matrix with diagonal elements
equal to the inverse of the variances of the sample moments, estimated by bootstrap re-sampling with clustering
at the individual level.
17As described above in Section 3.1, we observe wages in the sample only in quarters coinciding
with the administration of the annual SOEP survey and only for employed individuals who
answered all required survey questions. In the MSM estimation routine we recognize these
characteristics of our sample by matching moments based on sample wage observations with
moments constructed using simulated wage draws that have survived the same selection mecha-
nisms as the sample wage observations.37 In particular, a simulated wage draw is included in the
construction of the simulated moments if and only if: (i) employment is the individual’s optimal
choice in the simulated sample; (ii) the quarter is one in which the individual was surveyed; and
(iii) the observation survived random elimination of accepted wage draws designed to account
for non-random non-response.38 Non-labor income and non-linearities in the tax and transfer
schedules provide exclusion restrictions and thus ensure that identiﬁcation of the parameters in
the wage equation is not reliant purely on functional form.
Appendix D provides details concerning our treatment of the initial conditions. This section
also contains our estimates of the parameters that characterize the initial conditions. We note
here that the parameters appearing in the initial conditions are estimated jointly with the struc-
tural parameters. Further, by including unobservables that may aﬀect both the initial conditions
and subsequent behavior, our estimation methodology accounts fully for the endogeneity of the
initial observations of individuals’ experience, wages, wealth and employment status.39
4.2 Goodness of Fit and Structural Parameter Estimates
In Appendix E we show that our model ﬁts accurately important aspects of individuals’ observed
behavior. In particular, we demonstrate that our model is able to replicate observed features
of: the distributions of wages and changes in wages; life-cycle labor supply and retirement
behavior; the age proﬁle of wealth; and the patterns of transitions between employment and
unemployment. Additionally, we highlight here that the estimated model is able to ﬁt the
observed relationship between life expectancy and retirement; thus we conclude that our model
provides a sound basis for counterfactual policy simulations which investigate the eﬀect of life
expectancy on life-cycle behavior. In more detail, we obtain a summary measure of the observed
relationship between life expectancy and retirement by running an OLS regression of retirement
on age 65 life expectancy, age dummies, cohort dummies and time dummies. Note that we are
able to separate cohort eﬀects from the eﬀect of life expectancy due to the presence of diﬀerences
between demographic groups in the extent of improvements in life expectancy over time. The
coeﬃcient on life expectancy in this OLS regression is -0.066 (with a robust individual-level
clustered standard error of 0.027). Meanwhile, the corresponding coeﬃcient on life expectancy
37Note that our structural model features the joint determination of wage and employment outcomes and
therefore accepted simulated wage oﬀers are subject to the same selectivity as sample wage observations.
38In more detail: we estimate the probability of an employed individual refusing to answer one or more of the
survey questions necessary to construct an hourly wage measure. We then exclude the simulated wage draws of
employed individuals with the same probability. This method assumes that survey non-response is based purely
on observed individual characteristics.
39Health, measured by an indicator of the individual having health problems that limit daily activities, enters
the model as a stochastic and exogenous state variable. We estimate the parameters of an equation of motion for
health in which an individual’s age t health status is a function of health status in the previous period, age and
demographic variables. The parameters from this initial estimation are used to simulate the evolution of health
when estimating the parameters of the structural model.





West German 0.335 0.046
Male  West German 0.154 0.065
Education (years)/10 0.834 0.053
Experience (years)/50 0.330 0.090
Native German 0.079 0.035
(Age   54)I(54  Age < 59)/10 -0.040 0.097
(Age   59)I(Age  59)/10 -0.181 0.138
Health problems -0.038 0.033
Probability of receiving a new match-speciﬁc eﬀect (Π) 0.148 0.048
Standard deviation of match-speciﬁc eﬀect (σ) 0.085 0.008
Standard deviation of permanent individual eﬀect (σ) 0.222 0.034
Standard deviation of transitory shock (σ) 0.023 0.006
Job Oﬀer Probability (Θ)
Intercept -2.374 -0.144
(Age   40)I(40  Age < 54)/14 -0.278 0.166
(Age   54)I(54  Age < 59)/5 -1.311 0.271
(Age   59)I(Age  59)/5 -0.398 0.731
West German 0.814 0.133
Health problems -0.197 0.206
Standard deviation of individual eﬀect in job oﬀer probability (Σ

11) 1.029 0.064
Involuntary Separation Probability (Γ)
Intercept -4.759 0.339
(Age   40)I(40  Age < 54)/14 2.984 0.388
(Age   54)I(54  Age < 59)/5 0.337 0.204
(Age   59)I(Age  59)/5 2.984 0.459
West German -1.940 0.288
Health problems 0.964 0.218
Standard deviation of individual eﬀect in separations (Σ

22) 0.798 0.125




Coeﬃcient on consumption (β) 5.839 1.046
CRRA (ρ) 2.565 0.138
Mean of complementary parameter (µ) 0.221 0.044
Standard deviation of complementarity parameter (σ) 0.112 0.059
Annual subjective time discount factor (δ) 0.989 0.008
Probability of Retirement Eligibility on the Grounds of Disability (Υ)
Intercept -0.745 0.457
Health problems 0.797 0.414
Male 0.384 0.374
χ2 statistic=1155.8; Degrees of freedom=183
Notes: “Health problems” is an indicator of the individual having health problems that limit daily
activities. The mean and standard deviation of the complementarity parameter (ηi) after allowing
for truncation are 0.231 (with a standard error of 0.023) and 0.106 (with a standard error of 0.028)
respectively.
implied by our estimation results is -0.059, which is less than 0.3 of a standard error away from
the corresponding observed quantity.
Table 1 shows the estimated values of the parameters appearing in the wage equation, the
job oﬀer and involuntary separation probabilities, preferences and the equation describing the
19probability of being eligible for early retirement on the grounds of disability. Looking ﬁrst at the
wage equation, we ﬁnd that oﬀered wages increase signiﬁcantly with experience. This ﬁnding
underlines the importance of experience-based human capital accumulation in the determination
of wage oﬀers, and for labor supply behavior over the life-cycle more generally. Ceteris paribus,
oﬀered wages are higher in west Germany than in the east, and native Germans and men receive
signiﬁcantly higher wage oﬀers than immigrants and women respectively. We estimate the
rate of return to one year of education to be 8.34%. Finally, our estimation results indicate that
unobservables play an important role in wage determination. Of all the permitted unobservables,
the permanent individual eﬀect (αi) has the highest standard deviation and therefore has the
largest impact on wage oﬀers. This ﬁnding implies that unobserved diﬀerences in wages are
driven primarily by diﬀerences in permanent unobserved individual characteristics. However, we
also ﬁnd a signiﬁcant unobserved match-speciﬁc eﬀect; quantitatively, we ﬁnd that each quarter
an individual has a 14.8% chance of receiving a new match-speciﬁc draw. This corresponds to
an individual receiving a new match-speciﬁc draw on average every 6.8 quarters.
The job oﬀer and involuntary separation probabilities display clear age patterns: older indi-
viduals are less likely to receive a job oﬀer and are more likely to be subject to an involuntary
separation than younger individuals. As expected, those in poor health and those living in east
Germany are relatively likely to be subject to an involuntary separation and are relatively un-
likely to receive a job oﬀer. Unobserved individual characteristics have signiﬁcant eﬀects on the
job oﬀer and involuntary separation probabilities. The unobservables aﬀecting job oﬀers and
involuntary separations are found to be signiﬁcantly negatively correlated which is consistent
with those unobserved characteristics that contribute positively to involuntary separations also
having a negative eﬀect on the probability of receiving a job oﬀer. We ﬁnd that the probability
of being eligible for early retirement on the grounds of disability is positively and signiﬁcantly
(at the 5.4% level) related to the presence of health problems.
The coeﬃcient on consumption, β, is signiﬁcantly greater than zero which implies that indi-
viduals’ behavior is inﬂuenced by the ﬁnancial incentives associated with employment, retirement
and wealth accumulation. We ﬁnd that ηi, the individual-speciﬁc parameter that governs the
degree of complementarily between consumption and leisure, displays signiﬁcant variation over
individuals. Moreover, after allowing for truncation of ηi from above at 0.999 and from below at
0, the mean value of ηi is 0.231. This implies that on average 23.1% of consumption is required
to compensate an employed individual for the disutility of working. Our estimate of the annu-
alized subjective time discount factor is 0.989, a ﬁgure which is in line with previous ﬁndings,
e.g., De Nardi et al. (2010). Finally, we estimate the CRRA parameter, ρ, to be 2.565 and we
therefore conclude that individuals are risk averse. Both the subjective time discount factor and
the CRRA parameter are precisely estimated, which lays testament to the quality and relevance
of the available consumption information.
205 Policy Analysis
5.1 Longevity, Optimal Life-cycle Behavior and Net Government Revenue
The determination of how public pension systems may be reformed to ensure their ﬁnancial
stability in the face of improving longevity requires a precise understanding of the behavioral
and ﬁscal implications of increasing life expectancy. We therefore commence our counterfactual
policy analysis by using the life-cycle model described above, together with our parameter es-
timates, to explore the eﬀects of an increase in life expectancy. Speciﬁcally, we compare the
optimal life-cycle behavior, and associated tax, transfer and pension receipts, of two groups of
individuals who diﬀer only with respect to life expectancy. Each individual in the ﬁrst group
is assigned the appropriate gender-speciﬁc and region-speciﬁc life expectancy of the 1942 birth
cohort, that is the life expectancy of an individual from the appropriate demographic group
who was 65 years old in 2007. Meanwhile, each individual in the second group is assigned the
appropriate predicted individual-speciﬁc life expectancy of the 1982 birth cohort, who will reach
age 65 years 40 years after individuals in the ﬁrst group, i.e., in 2047. According to the HMD
for Germany, life expectancy at age 65 is anticipated to be on average 6.4 years higher for the
1982 birth cohort than for the 1942 birth cohort.40 For both groups of individuals, we ﬁx the
distribution of all characteristics other than life expectancy at that observed in our sample and
we impose the year 2007 tax, transfer and pension systems throughout.
Figures 3(a) - 3(c) show how the rates of employment, unemployment and retirement are
aﬀected by the 6.4 year increase in age 65 life expectancy anticipated to occur over the 40
years that separate the 1942 and 1982 birth cohorts. We ﬁnd that among individuals aged
under 57 years there is little adjustment in retirement behavior.41 Instead, a small proportion
of such individuals, approximately 0.1 percent, switch from unemployment to employment. In
contrast, the employment, unemployment and retirement behavior of individuals aged over 57
years displays a strong dependence on life expectancy. In particular, we ﬁnd that the considered
6.4 year increase in age 65 life expectancy leads individuals aged over 57 years to postpone
retirement. The magnitude of this eﬀect is relatively large: the increase in life expectancy
under consideration reduces the retirement rate by an average of approximately 1 percentage
point for those aged 57-64.75 years and by almost 3 percentage points for individuals aged 64
years. Intuitively, an increase in life expectancy raises the expected future returns to both
current employment and current unemployment (provided that the individual is eligible for
Unemployment Insurance), through which individuals are able to accumulate pension points,
and hence leads to a substitution away from retirement.
The postponement of retirement among individuals approaching the full pensionable age of
65 years is balanced by an increase in unemployment and, to a lesser extent, an increase in
employment. For example, the 6.4 year increase in age 65 life expectancy under consideration
causes the unemployment rate of individuals aged 64 years to increase by 2 percentage points
40The corresponding increase in life expectancy at birth over the 40 years that separate these two cohorts is
roughly 10 years. Therefore, the anticipated evolution of life expectancy in Germany is broadly in line with the
widespread trend in life expectancy in the developed world documented by Oeppen and Vaupel (2002).
41Prior to age 57 years we predict a small increase in retirement. This eﬀect can be explained by higher
employment rates earlier in the life-cycle which, ceteris paribus, make retirement ﬁnancially more attractive later
in the life-cycle.
21Figure 3: Life expectancy improvement between 1942 and 1982 birth cohorts:
Eﬀects over the life-cycle on rates of employment, unemployment and retirement and on net
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Notes: All ﬁgures refer to individuals aged 40-64.75 years.
while the corresponding increase in the employment rate is only 0.85 of a percentage point.
There are two factors which lead the postponement of retirement to be balanced predominantly
by higher unemployment. First, our results imply a relatively low job oﬀer probability and a
relatively high rate of involuntary separations for older individuals. Therefore those wanting to
retire later may have diﬃculty ﬁnding or keeping a job. Second, the Unemployment Insurance
system provides a strong incentive for individuals to use unemployment as a stepping-stone into
retirement. Speciﬁcally, the relatively long entitlement periods for Unemployment Insurance
beneﬁts for older individuals (see Appendix A.1) make it attractive for such individuals to enter
retirement after a spell of unemployment. The design of the public pension system increases this
incentive because individuals collecting Unemployment Insurance beneﬁts accumulate additional
pension points which increase public pension beneﬁts upon retirement.
Next, we consider the eﬀect of an increase in life expectancy on net Government revenue,
NGR, which takes the following form
NGR = Income Tax + 2  SSC   UIB   SAB   Public Pension Beneﬁts, (15)
where Income Tax consists of taxes paid on labor income, pension income and interest income
from wealth holdings, SSC denotes individual Social Security Contributions (this ﬁgure is multi-
plied by two because ﬁrms must match individuals’ contributions), and UIB and SAB correspond
22Table 2: Life expectancy improvement between 1942 and 1982 birth cohorts:
Eﬀects on average net Government revenue per person, years of employment post age 40 years,
retirement age and weighted pension points upon retirement.
Birth Public Pension: Average Life Net Government Revenue Per Person Yr Emp.
Ret. Age
Pension
Cohort FPA/ Pension Value Exp. at 65 All Emp. Unemp. Retired Age40 Points
1942 65/ 2007 System 83.3 57005 288249 -30682 -200562 17.75 62.35 39.29
1982 65/ 2007 System 89.7 -18446 294666 -31995 -281117 17.78 62.43 39.34
Change (1982   1942 cohort) 6.4 -75451 6418 -1312 -80556 0.03 0.08 0.05
Notes: “FPA” refers to the full pensionable age and “Pension Value” is the per-year value of public pension
beneﬁts. “Net Government Revenue Per Person” is the average per person (starting at age 40 years and
continuing until death) net revenue received by the Government, measured in Euors. “Yr Emp. Age  40” is
the average number of years of employment post age 40 years and “Ret. Age” is the average age of retirement.
“Pension Points” is the average number of weighted pension points accumulated prior to the date of retirement.
respectively to Unemployment Insurance beneﬁts and Social Assistance beneﬁts. We analyze
here the eﬀect of life expectancy on average net Government revenue per person per month
according to age, focusing on those aged below the full pensionable age of 65 years. Meanwhile,
in the more aggregated analysis presented in the next paragraph we additionally include net
transfers made to individuals aged 65 years and above. Figure 3(d) shows that the 6.4 year
increase in life expectancy anticipated to occur between the 1942 and 1982 birth cohorts leads,
via optimizing individuals adjusting employment, retirement and consumption behavior, to an
increase in average monthly net Government revenue per person at every age prior to the full
pensionable age of 65 years. Thus, the increase in pension demands associated with longer life
expectancy is partly oﬀset by higher tax receipts from individuals aged below the full pension-
able age. In line with the age proﬁle of responses in labor supply and retirement behavior,
we ﬁnd that the increase in average monthly per-person net Government revenue is largest for
individuals aged 64 years: for such individuals, average net Government revenue increases by
approximately 20 Euros per person per month.
We now extend our analysis of the ﬁscal eﬀects for the Government of an increase in life
expectancy by additionally considering net transfers made to individuals aged equal to or above
the full pensionable age of 65 years. In more detail, based on the estimated model, we determine
the net transfer made to the Government by each individual in each quarter of his or her life,
starting at age 40 years and continuing until death. Summing over an individual’s life yields the
total post age 40 years net transfer made by the individual to the Government. Finally, averaging
over individuals provides an estimate of average per-person net Government revenue. Table 2
shows that, holding ﬁxed the tax, transfer and pension systems, the increase in life expectancy
anticipated to occur between the 1942 and 1982 birth cohorts leads to a substantial deterioration
of Government’s net budgetary position. Speciﬁcally, the considered 6.4 year increase in age 65
life expectancy leads to a decrease in average per-person net Government revenue of 75451
Euros. Decomposing, the increase in life expectancy under consideration has a minor positive
eﬀect on the average transfer made to unemployed individuals, and causes net Government
revenue received from employed individuals to increase by an average of 6418 Euros per person.
However, the average net transfer made to retired individuals increase by 80556 Euros per
person. This dramatic increase in the average net transfer made to retired individuals is due
mainly to the mechanical eﬀect of longer life expectancy increasing the expected duration over
23Table 3: Life expectancy improvement between 1942 and 1982 birth cohorts:
Implications for wealth accumulation and consumption
Birth Public Pension: Wealth on Monthly Income Total Cons. Monthly Consumption
Cohort FPA/Pension Value Retirement from Wealth post Age 40 Age 45 Age 55 FPA (Age 65)
1942 65/ 2007 System 27371 146 571197 1291 1341 1054
1982 65/ 2007 System 28402 126 665166 1294 1336 1035
Diﬀerence (1982   1942 cohort): 1031 -20 93969 3 -5 -19
Notes: “Wealth on Retirement” is average per-person private wealth at the date of retirement. “Monthly
Income from Wealth” is the average per-person actuarially fair monthly annuity income wealth at the date
of retirement. Consumption (Cons.) ﬁgures are averaged over individuals. Consumption and wealth ﬁgures
are in Euros. “FPA” refers to the full pensionable age.
which public pension beneﬁts are payable.42
Lastly, we analyze the eﬀect of life expectancy on consumption choices and wealth accumu-
lation. Intuitively, in response to an increase in life expectancy, optimizing individuals adjust
consumption in order to equalize the higher return to saving with marginal utility of contem-
poraneous consumption, which in turn depends on current employment behavior. Empirically,
Table 3 shows that the considered 6.4 year increase in age 65 life expectancy leads average in-
dividual wealth at the date of retirement to increase by 1031 Euros.43 This result, which is in
line with the ﬁndings of De Nardi et al. (2009) and De Nardi et al. (2010), demonstrates that
the ability to alter wealth accumulation decisions provides individuals with a valuable means
of adjusting behavior in response to an improvement in longevity. Recognition of this fact is
necessary for understanding the eﬀects of reductions in the generosity of the public pension
system, discussed below in Section 5.2.
Table 3 further shows that the increase in life expectancy anticipated to occur between the
1942 and 1982 birth cohorts leads to a fall in the income stream that retired individuals are
able to obtain from accumulated wealth of the order of 21 Euros per month. Thus, increased
wealth accumulation prior to retirement is insuﬃcient to compensate for the eﬀect of higher life
expectancy on the feasible income stream obtainable from wealth holdings. Due to increased
pension point accumulation prior to retirement, we ﬁnd that the considered increase in age
65 life expectancy causes average monthly consumption at age 65 years and above to fall by
slightly less than the decline in the feasible income stream obtainable from accumulated wealth.
Speciﬁcally, consumption at age 65 years and above falls by an average of 19 Euros per month.
We further note that the increase in age 65 life expectancy under consideration is associated
with only small adjustments in monthly consumption at ages 45 and 55 years. Therefore, as a
ﬁrst approximation, the extra employment income obtained by such individuals is being used
solely to increase wealth holdings.
Notwithstanding the fall in the average monthly consumption of retired individuals, the 6.4
year increase in age 65 years life expectancy anticipated to occur between the 1942 and 1982
birth cohorts causes expected total per-person post age 40 years consumption to increase by
approximately 94000 Euros. Roughly 75000 Euros of this increase is accounted for by increased
transfers from the Government (see Table 2) while the remaining 19000 Euros is ﬁnanced from
42Additionally, transfer payments to retired individuals increase slightly due to the higher value of public
pension beneﬁts, which reﬂects the increase in average pension points accumulated prior to retirement.
43This eﬀect consists of a component arising from changes in savings decisions and a component due to alter-
ations in the timing of entry into retirement.
24increased wage income and additional interest income from wealth.44
5.2 Fiscal and Behavioral Eﬀects of Reductions in Public Pension Generosity
The substantial deterioration in the Government’s budgetary position created by a readily fore-
seeable increase in life expectancy conﬁrms a role for reforms to the public pension system de-
signed to address the ﬁscal costs created by improving longevity. With this in mind, we examine
the eﬀectiveness of reductions in the generosity of the public pension system at counterbalancing
the aggregate ﬁscal consequences of increasing life expectancy. Speciﬁcally, we consider the 6.4
year increase in age 65 life expectancy anticipated to occur over the 40 years that separate the
1942 and 1982 birth cohorts and we analyze the behavioral and ﬁscal eﬀects of: (i) increases
in the full pensionable age; and (ii) cuts in the per-year value of public pension beneﬁts. As in
Section 5.1, when conducting this analysis we ﬁx the distribution of all characteristics other than
life expectancy at that observed in our sample and we impose the year 2007 tax and transfer
systems throughout. Unless otherwise indicated, we use the 2007 pension system.
The top panel of Table 4 summarizes the eﬀects on labor market behavior and net Govern-
ment revenue of increasing the full pensionable age from its current value of 65 years.45 We ﬁnd
that increases in the full pensionable age have strong eﬀects on labor supply behavior. Speciﬁ-
cally, such reforms lead individuals to postpone retirement and to increase years of employment
prior to retirement. Indeed, within the range of reforms under consideration, a one year increase
in the full pensionable age causes the average retirement age to increase by approximately 0.9 of
a year, and causes average years of employment prior to retirement to increase by 0.85 of a year.
Increases in the full pensionable lead to appreciable increases in the average net transfer made
to the Government from employed individuals, and cause substantial reductions in the average
transfer payment made to retired individuals.
Overall, our calculations suggest that the full pensionable age must be increased to 69.34
years in order to oﬀset the ﬁscal consequences for the Government of 40 years worth of growth
in life expectancy. In other words, a 6.4 year increase in age 65 life expectancy requires that the
full pensionable age be increased by 4.34 years in order to restore the Government’s budgetary
position.46 This policy eliminates the approximately 75000 Euros per-person deﬁcit created by
40 years worth of growth in life expectancy via two main routes. First, an increase of 4.34 years
in the full pensionable age increases the net transfer received by the Government from employed
individuals by an average of approximately 54000 Euros per person. Second, the net transfer
made to retired individuals declines by an average of roughly 23000 Euros per person.
The bottom panel of Table 4 summarizes the eﬀects on labor market behavior and net
Government revenue of cuts in the per-year value of public pension beneﬁts. Throughout these
calculations the full pensionable age is held ﬁxed at its current value of 65 years. This set of
44One of the eﬀects of the improvement in longevity under study is to cause the survival rate prior to the full
pensionable age of 65 years to increase. Ceteris paribus, this change leads to an increase in expected life-time
wage income. Indeed, further analysis (not reported) shows that this eﬀect accounts for the majority of the
non-Government ﬁnanced increase in expected total post age 40 years consumption.
45When conducting this analysis the age-based requirements for early retirement were increased in line with
the increase in the full pensionable age.
46This ﬁgure was obtained by computing the net Government revenue associated with full pensionable ages of
69.25 years and 69.5 years and then interpolating linearly to ﬁnd the increase in the full pensionable age that
oﬀsets exactly the ﬁscal consequences of 40 years worth of growth in life expectancy.
25Table 4: Public pension reforms:
Eﬀects on average net Government revenue per person, years of employment post age 40
years, retirement age and weighted pension points upon retirement
Birth Public Pension: Net Government Revenue Per Person Yr Emp.
Ret. Age
Pension
Cohort FPA/Pension Value All Employed Unemployed Retired Age40 Points
Increased full pensionable age:
1982 66/ 2007 System -65 308534 -31787 -276812 18.70 63.37 40.31
1982 67/ 2007 System 16392 320443 -32192 -271860 19.52 64.26 41.18
1982 68/ 2007 System 33096 332352 -33240 -266016 20.31 65.24 42.04
1982 69/ 2007 System 48140 341927 -33952 -259835 20.99 66.04 42.76
1982 70/ 2007 System 68620 356808 -33393 -254796 21.99 66.99 43.84
1982 71/ 2007 System 88413 371205 -33269 -249522 22.97 68.00 44.85
Revenue neutral full pensionable age:
1982 69.34/ 2007 System 57005 348609 -33314 -258290 21.42 66.39 43.24
Cut in the per-year value of public pension benets:
1982 65/ 2007 System   5% -6198 295143 -32936 -268405 17.79 62.58 39.39
1982 65/ 2007 System   10% 5427 295281 -33919 -255936 17.79 62.72 39.41
1982 65/ 2007 System   15% 16242 295205 -35060 -243903 17.77 62.86 39.43
1982 65/ 2007 System   20% 26699 295184 -36275 -232211 17.75 63.02 39.45
1982 65/ 2007 System   25% 36448 294996 -37609 -220938 17.72 63.19 39.47
1982 65/ 2007 System   30% 45290 294589 -38998 -210301 17.70 63.36 39.48
1982 65/ 2007 System   35% 53135 294053 -40520 -200398 17.66 63.54 39.48
1982 65/ 2007 System   40% 60231 293466 -41806 -191429 17.62 63.69 39.47
Revenue neutral cut in the per-year value of public pension benets:
1982 65/ 2007 System   37.7% 57005 293666 -41205 -195456 17.63 63.62 39.47
Notes: See Table 2.
reforms has hardly any eﬀect on individuals’ optimal life-cycle employment behavior and induces
a relatively minor postponement of retirement, of the order of 0.20 of a year for every 5 percentage
point cut in the per-year value of public pension beneﬁts. In terms of net Government revenue,
cuts in the per-year value of public pension beneﬁts have essentially no eﬀect on average net
Government revenue received from employed individuals. Meanwhile, total life-cycle transfers
made to unemployed individuals increase by an average of approximately 1100 Euros per person
for every 5 percentage point cut in the per-year value of public pension beneﬁts. However,
cuts in the per-year value of public pension beneﬁts cause net Government revenue to increase
due to considerably lower net transfers to retired individuals. We ﬁnd that the per-period
value of public pension beneﬁts must be reduced by 37.7% in order to counterbalance the ﬁscal
consequences of 40 years worth of growth in life expectancy.
We conclude our analysis of public pension reforms with Table 5, which explores the eﬀects
of increases in the full pensionable age and cuts in the per-year value of public pension beneﬁts
on individuals’ wealth accumulation and consumption behavior. We ﬁnd that increases in the
full pensionable age have little eﬀect on wealth accumulated at the date of retirement or on
monthly consumption at ages 45 or 55 years. The main routes, therefore, by which individuals
re-optimize in response to an increase in the full pensionable age are via employment behavior
and the timing of retirement, as documented in Table 4. Increases in the full pensionable age
do, however, lead expected total post age 40 years consumption to increase, a change that
can be linked to increased consumption among retirees. In particular, consumption at the full
pensionable age, i.e., the ﬁrst date at which all individuals are necessarily retired, increases by
an average of 122 Euros per month when the full pensionable age is increased from 65 years to
71 years. This change reﬂects predominantly the returns to higher life-cycle employment which
26Table 5: Public pension reforms:
Implications for wealth accumulation and consumption
Birth Public Pension: Wealth on Monthly Income Total Cons. Monthly Consumption
Cohort FPA/Pension Value Retirement from Wealth post age 40 Age 45 Age 55 FPA
Increased full pensionable age:
1982 66/ 2007 System 27593 124 674758 1300 1336 1053
1982 67/ 2007 System 28266 130 683404 1296 1334 1074
1982 68/ 2007 System 28001 131 690998 1296 1340 1091
1982 69/ 2007 System 28323 135 696110 1296 1338 1104
1982 70/ 2007 System 27928 137 705731 1298 1339 1127
1982 71/ 2007 System 28502 144 715758 1296 1339 1157
Revenue neutral full pensionable age:
1982 69.34/ 2007 System 27979 135 700469 1298 1339 1114
Cut in the per-year value of public pension benets:
1982 65/ 2007 System   5% 29751 132 654648 1291 1329 1004
1982 65/ 2007 System   10% 31022 138 644059 1289 1321 973
1982 65/ 2007 System   15% 32280 144 633804 1285 1314 943
1982 65/ 2007 System   20% 33369 149 623932 1282 1306 914
1982 65/ 2007 System   25% 34229 153 614358 1279 1300 886
1982 65/ 2007 System   30% 34747 156 605155 1277 1294 858
1982 65/ 2007 System   35% 35055 158 596543 1276 1289 831
1982 65/ 2007 System   40% 35249 160 588536 1274 1284 806
Revenue neutral cut in the per-year value of public pension benets:
1982 65/ 2007 System   37.7% 35138 157 592049 1275 1286 817
Notes: See Table 3.
occur through the intertemporal linkages present in the public pension system; increased income
from accumulated wealth, arising from the postponement of retirement, also contributes to the
higher average consumption of retirees, however the magnitude of this eﬀect is relatively small.
In contrast, as illustrated in the bottom panel of Table 5, we ﬁnd that cuts in the per-year
value of public pension beneﬁts have a dramatic positive eﬀect on wealth accumulation: for the
reforms under consideration, each 5 percentage point cut in the per-year value of public pension
beneﬁts leads average wealth accumulated at the date of retirement to increase by over 1000
Euros per person. Moreover, given the modest eﬀect of cuts in the per-year value of public
pension beneﬁts on the timing of retirement, increased wealth accumulation translates into a
higher feasible income stream obtainable upon retirement from accumulated wealth. However,
increased wealth accumulation prior to retirement is not suﬃcient to counter the income eﬀects
of cuts in the per-year value of public pension beneﬁts. Therefore, following a cut in the per-year
value of public pension beneﬁts, monthly consumption at the full pensionable age decreases, as
does expected total post age 40 years consumption.
In summary, an increase in the full pensionable age of 4.34 years and a cut in the per-year
value of public pension beneﬁts of 37.7% both neutralize the eﬀect on the Government’s net rev-
enue position of the 6.4 year increase in age 65 life expectancy anticipated to occur during the
40 years that separate the 1942 and 1982 birth cohorts. However, these two revenue-equivalent
policy approaches have dramatically diﬀerent implications for individuals’ labor supply and re-
tirement behavior, for wealth accumulation and for consumption outcomes. Notably, reinstating
the Government’s budgetary position by increasing the full pensionable age leads to a higher
average retirement age and a higher employment rate as compared to if the Government’s bud-
getary position is preserved by cutting the per-year value of public pension beneﬁts; however,
cutting the per-year value of public pension beneﬁts has a much larger eﬀect on wealth accumu-
27lation than does increasing in the full pensionable age. Arguably most importantly, of these two
revenue-equivalent policies, expected total post age 40 years consumption is highest following
the increase in the full pensionable age. We conclude, therefore, that a reduction in public
pension generosity operationalized via an increase in the full pensionable age generates a greater
increase in productivity than a revenue-equivalent reform which entails a cut in the per-year
value of public pension beneﬁts.
6 Conclusion
The life expectancy of individuals living in the developed world is anticipated to increase ap-
preciably over the coming decades. In Germany, for example, during the 40 years that separate
the 1942 and 1982 birth cohorts life expectancy at age 65 is projected to increase by 6.4 years.
This substantial demographic change poses a threat to the sustainability of many deﬁned beneﬁt
public pension systems. Using a rich dynamic structural life-cycle model in which individuals’ op-
timal employment, retirement and consumption decisions depend, inter alia, on life expectancy
and the design of the public pension system, we have examined the behavioral and ﬁscal impli-
cations of improving longevity. Moreover, we have drawn on the estimated model and explored
the eﬀects of reductions in the generosity of the public pension system.
Our results show that, in the context of Germany, 40 years worth of growth in life expectancy
leads to a substantial deterioration in the Government’s net budgetary position. This outcome
arises despite a mitigating eﬀect due to individuals optimally increasing employment and post-
poning retirement in response to an improvement in longevity. This ﬁnding conﬁrms the need
for policy reforms that address the additional ﬁscal demands on Government ﬁnances created
by an ageing society. Counterfactual policy simulations based on the estimated model show
that the full pensionable age must be increased by 4.34 years, from 65 years to 69.34 years, in
order to oﬀset the ﬁscal consequences for the Government of the 6.4 year increase in age 65
life expectancy anticipated to occur over the 40 years that separate the 1942 and 1982 birth
cohorts. Alternatively, given the current full pensionable age of 65 years, we show that the
Government’s net budgetary position can be reinstated via a cut of 37.7% in the per-year value
of public pension beneﬁts. The latter approach to counterbalancing the ﬁscal consequences of 40
years worth of growth in life expectancy generates the greatest increase in wealth accumulation.
However, comparing these two revenue equivalent policies, we ﬁnd that the employment rate
and expected total per-person post age 40 years consumption are both markedly higher if the
reduction in public pension generosity is instead achieved via an increase in the full pensionable
age.
In addition to making a signiﬁcant contribution to the current policy debate on public pension
reform, this paper provides several insights regarding the analysis of individual behavior over
the life-cycle. Notably, the incentives induced by the pension system have been shown to play
an important role in explaining individuals’ life-cycle employment, retirement and consumption
decisions. We conclude, therefore, that a detailed depiction of the pension system should be
central to the modeling of many aspects of life-cycle behavior. Perhaps more importantly, the
results of our counterfactual policy simulations demonstrate that an increase in life expectancy
has implications for optimal individual behavior prior to the full pensionable age. Our analysis
28indicates, therefore, that an accurate understanding of the ﬁscal and behavioral implications of
improving longevity requires a life-cycle approach which permits behavioral responses in terms
of employment, retirement and consumption. Previously, life-cycle modeling has been used to
understand the implications of life expectancy for decisions related to wealth accumulation. The
life-cycle model developed and estimated in this paper recognizes the dependence of employment
and retirement decisions, as well as consumption choices, on life expectancy. Our analysis
therefore extends previous research along an important dimension.
Appendix
A The German Tax, Transfer and Pension Systems
This appendix provides further details concerning the German tax, transfer and pension systems.
The parameters and rules described here, together with the discussion provided in Section 2.4,
deﬁne work incentives which are an important force driving individuals’ life-cycle employment,
retirement and consumption behavior. This section closes with a discussion of our approach to
modeling individuals’ expectations concerning the evolution of the public pension system.
A.1 Tax and Transfer Systems: Further Details
Table 6 summarizes selected features of tax and transfer system, while Table 7 provides further
details concerning the Unemployment Insurance system.
Table 6: Selected features of the German tax and transfer systems: 1991 - 2007
Social Security Contributions Income tax Social Assistance
Contribution Max. Cont. Max. Cont. Tax free Top marginal Solidarity Average Average
Year rate west east allowance tax rate tax west east
(%) per month per month per year (%) (%) per month per month
1991 17.7 3250 1700 4050 53 3.3 550 500
1992 18.4 3400 2400 4050 53 3.75 540 520
1993 18.6 3600 2650 4050 53 0 550 544
1994 19.4 3800 2950 4050 53 0 557 545
1995 19.6 3900 3200 4050 53 7.5 564 553
1996 20.1 4000 3400 6021 53 7.5 571 560.5
1997 21.0 4100 3550 6021 53 7.5 580 569.5
1998 21.1 4200 3500 6156 53 5.5 586 575
1999 21.1 4250 3600 6507 53 5.5 594 584
2000 20.5 4300 3550 6876 51 5.5 606 596
2001 20.4 4350 3650 7200 48.5 5.5 617 606
2002 20.6 4500 3750 7200 48.5 5.5 629 617
2003 21.0 5100 4250 7200 48.5 5.5 634 622
2004 21.0 5150 4350 7632 45 5.5 643 631
2005 20.7 5200 4400 7632 42 5.5 653 637
2006 21.0 5250 4400 7632 42 5.5 658 642
2007 20.3 5250 4550 7632 45 5.5 662 645
Notes: Unless indicated otherwise, all ﬁgures are in Euros and are expressed in nominal terms. Social
Assistance consists of a person-related component that varies by region of residence and individual-speciﬁc
housing beneﬁts. Housing beneﬁts are limited to the cost of a reasonable apartment, given local property
prices and household size.
29Table 7: Maximum Unemployment Insurance entitlement period by age: 1991 - 2007
Age (years) Prior to April 1997 From April 1997 until Jan 2006 Since February 2006
< 42 12 12 12
42–43 18 12 12
44 22 12 12
45–46 22 18 12
47–48 22 22 12
49–51 26 22 12
52–53 26 26 12
54 32 26 12
55–56 32 26 18
 57 32 32 18
Notes: Adapted from Schmitz and Steiner (2007). Individuals accumulate entitlement to Unem-
ployment Insurance beneﬁts at a rate of one month of Unemployment Insurance entitlement for
every two months of employment, up to the relevant age-speciﬁc maximum detailed in this table.
For the duration of the entitlement period, Unemployment Insurance beneﬁts provide an income of
up to 60% of an individual’s net income in his or her most recent job.
A.2 Public Pension System: Further Details
A.2.1 Pension Point Values
Table 8 shows the proportionality factors used to compute the value of the non-reduced public
pension. This table also shows the adjustment factor applied the wages of east Germans prior
to determining the pension point weight.
Table 8: Pension point values (proportionality factors): 1991 - 2007
Year
Point value in Euros
Adjustment factor for east Germany
West Germany East Germany
1991 20.74 (25.32) 13.59 (15.78) 1.37
1992 21.80 (25.32) 13.59 (15.78) 1.44
1993 22.75 (25.31) 16.45 (18.30) 1.32
1994 23.52 (25.48) 17.63 (19.10) 1.27
1995 23.64 (25.16) 18.58 (19.79) 1.23
1996 23.86 (25.04) 19.62 (20.59) 1.22
1997 24.26 (24.76) 20.71 (21.33) 1.21
1998 24.36 (24.71) 20.90 (21.33) 1.21
1999 24.69 (24.69) 21.48 (21.78) 1.21
2000 24.84 (24.35) 21.61 (21.61) 1.20
2001 25.31 (24.48) 22.06 (21.63) 1.20
2002 25.86 (24.75) 22.70 (21.95) 1.20
2003 26.13 (24.60) 22.97 (21.98) 1.19
2004 26.13 (24.13) 22.97 (21.63) 1.19
2005 26.13 (23.75) 22.97 (21.21) 1.18
2006 26.13 (23.75) 22.97 (20.88) 1.18
2007 26.27 (23.33) 23.09 (20.51) 1.18
Notes: Non-parenthesized ﬁgures are nominal and ﬁgures in parentheses have been
converted into year 2000 prices using the Retail Price Index.
A.2.2 Accumulation of Pension Points
In addition to the pension point accumulation methods detailed in Section 2.4.3, individuals
may be awarded further pension points in recognition of child-rearing. Speciﬁcally, one parent,
normally the mother, is credited with one pension point for each child born before 1992 and
three pension points for each child born more recently. Although we restrict our sample to men
30and women who are currently living without dependent children, it is possible that members of
our sample cared for children earlier in their lives. Reﬂecting the possibilities for individuals to
gain pension points for child-rearing, in the empirical implementation of the model we credit
all women who had at least one child prior to entering the sample with 3 additional pension
points. The German legislation further speciﬁes that individuals may be awarded additional
pension points for vocational training, university education, military or community service and
provision of care for relatives. We neglect these additional pension points in our analysis.
A.2.3 Eligibility for Early Retirement and Adjustments to Public Pension Benets
for Early Retirees
As noted in Section 2.4.3, the eligibility criteria for early retirement depend on gender, disability
status, working history and age. We provide here further details regarding the eligibility criteria
for early retirement. In addition, we describe the year-speciﬁc rules that deﬁne the value of
public pension beneﬁts received by early retirees. We reiterate that all of these details are fully
incorporated into our implementation of the above described life-cycle model.
Individuals aged under 60 years who are able to demonstrate suﬃciently poor health can
receive a disability pension. The value of the disability pension is proportional to the cumulative
value of the weighted pension points that the individual would have received if he or she had
remained in employment until age 60 years, with the proportionality factor being the same
as that used to determine the value of public pension beneﬁts for individuals retiring at the
full pensionable age. Additionally, individuals aged over 60 years who are able to demonstrate
suﬃciently poor health can take early retirement and thus claim public pension beneﬁts. Prior
to 2002, such individuals received a “non-reduced public pension”, the value of which is obtained
by multiplying the individual’s weighted pension points accumulated at the time of retirement
by the same proportionality factor as used to determine the value of public pension beneﬁts for
individuals retiring at the full pensionable age. More recently, the non-reduced public pension
has only been available to individuals with suﬃciently poor heath aged 63 years or over at the
date of retirement. Meanwhile, those entering early retirement between the ages of 60 and 63
years due to poor health have received a reduced public pension. The value of the reduced public
pension is obtained by applying a penalty to the non-reduced pension of 3.6% for every year
that the individual’s age upon retirement is below the full pensionable age of 65 years. This
adjustment is less than actuarially fair.
In addition, prior to 1999, women aged 60 years and above and men with suﬃciently long
service histories (deﬁned as at least 35 years of work experience) aged 63 years or over at the date
of retirement were able to retire and receive a non-reduced public pension. Legislative reforms
in 1992 and 1999 increased the age requirement for retirement on a non-reduced public pension
to 65 years for healthy men and women, and also introduced the right to early retirement from
age 60 years on a reduced public pension for individuals with long service histories. The value of
the reduced public pension is obtained by applying a penalty of 3.6% to the non-reduced pension
for every year that the individual’s age upon retirement is below the full pensionable age of 65
years. The phase-in period for the 1992 legislation commenced in 1997 and the combined 1992
and 1999 reforms will be fully eﬀective by 2017. See Bonin (2009) for further details.
31A.2.4 Expectations Concerning the Future Public Pension System
As explained in footnote 13, we assume that individuals expect the cohort-speciﬁc rules that
deﬁne the public pension system to be maintained. We describe here the public pension reforms
that occurred during the sample period and we argue that our modeling approach does not
neglect any important anticipated future changes in the public pension system.
Recent pension reforms have the potential to alter the generosity of future public pension
beneﬁts. Speciﬁcally, recent reforms have: (i) increased the full pensionable age from 65 to 67
years; (ii) changed the eligibility requirements for early retirement and reduced the generosity
of the public pension for some groups of early retirees; and (iii) changed the value of the pro-
portionality factor, via the introduction of a “sustainability factor”. The implications for the
current study of the increase in the full pensionable age were discussed above in footnote 24.
Regarding the treatment of those who wish to retire early, we note that reforms to either the
rules governing eligibility for early retirement or the adjustments made to the value of public
pension beneﬁts received by early retirees have always been announced many years in advance.
Therefore, these changes have not aﬀected the pension system applicable to individuals aged
over 40 years at the time of their announcement. It is therefore entirely realistic for us to assume
that the sample members, who are all aged 40 years or above, expect that the rules applicable
to their particular birth cohort will persist into the future.
Finally, the sustainability factor, introduced in 2005, constitutes an adjustment to the pro-
portionality factor and is designed to allow the public pension system to accommodate demo-
graphic changes and business cycle eﬀects. Speciﬁcally, the sustainability factor depends on the
ratio of the earnings of working individuals to the number of retired individuals, and acts to
reduce the generosity of public pension beneﬁts if this ratio decreases. It is anticipated that in
the long-run the sustainability factor will work to reduce the value of public pension beneﬁts.
However, the short-run eﬀects of the sustainability factor are unclear. Indeed, via the sustain-
ability factor, a recent rise in female labor force participation caused an increase in the value
of public pension beneﬁts. We therefore consider it unlikely that the introduction of the sus-
tainability factor will thus far have aﬀected strongly individuals’ expectations concerning future
public pension beneﬁts. Moreover, the sustainability factor was introduced in 2005, which is
towards the end of our sample period. For these reasons, we neglect the sustainability factor in
our analysis.
32B Value Function Approximation
Our method for approximating the value functions appearing in the life-cycle optimization prob-
lem is based on recursive simulation and interpolation, as ﬁrst introduced by Keane and Wolpin
(1994). In particular, we start with a set of randomly selected grid of points, where each grid
point represents a particular combination of age 64.75 years state variables and an age 64.75
employment and consumption choice. The age 64.75 years state variables are then updated to
the age 65 years values in accordance with the evolution of the underlying variables as speci-
ﬁed by the structural model. Next, we evaluate the age 65 years value function at each point
in the grid of age 65 years state space points; at age 65 years all individuals are retired and
therefore computation of the age 65 years value function is straight forward and follows from
equation (12). The results of an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression are used to express
the expected age 65 years value function in terms of variables known to the individual at age
64.75 years. This OLS regression, as well as those used in later value function approximations,
includes a total of 143 regressors and is implemented using a grid containing 5000 points.
At the next stage of the value function approximation, we move back one quarter to age
64.5 years, update the state space variables to the age 64.75 values, and compute the age
64.75 years value function associated with each age 64.75 years choice possibility. Consumption,
or equivalently, savings, is a continuous choice variable and therefore implementation of this
method requires discretization of the choice set. We achieve this by restricting attention to the
following choices: (i) employment in conjunction with savings of -500, 0, 500, 1000 and 2000
Euros per month; (ii) unemployment in conjunction with savings of -2000, -1000, -500, 0, and 500
Euros per month; and (iii) retirement. We construct the choice set to over-represent dissaving
combined with unemployment and saving combined with employment because these are the
most prevalent combinations of savings and labor supply choices.47 We replace the expected
age 65 years value function appearing in the age 64.75 choice-speciﬁc value functions with the
approximation obtained previously. The maximum of the age 64.75 years choice-speciﬁc value
functions is regressed on variables known to the individual at age 64.5 years. The regression
results express the expected maximum of the age 64.75 years choice-speciﬁc value functions in
terms of variables known to the individual at age 64.5 years. We continue backwards recursively
in this way until we reach age 40 years. To ensure that we capture the year-speciﬁc aspects
of the ﬁscal legislation, this entire procedure is repeated for each of the 17 diﬀerent tax and
transfer systems operational during the sample period.
47Importantly, as choices are made a quarterly intervals, the set of permitted annualized choices is much larger
than the set of quarterly choices.
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Wealth over the life-cycle: age-speciﬁc wealth levels and
wealth levels by gender and region
29
Subjective time discount factor () and
curvature parameter ()
Coeﬃcients from an OLS regression of annual wealth change
on age
2 As above
Coeﬃcient on life expectancy from an OLS regression of re-
tirement on life expectancy and controls for gender, region,
education, cohort and age
1 As above
Coeﬃcients from an OLS regression of log wages on experi-
ence, health, initial employment, region, education, nation-
ality, gender and age terms
14 Distribution of oﬀered wages
Distribution of log wages: percentiles of log wages and an-




lations in annual log wages
19 As above
Treatment eﬀects obtained from OLS regressions of transi-
tions between labor market states on the change in UI enti-
tlement period caused by the 1997 UI reform (see Haan and
Prowse, 2010)
20 Coeﬃcient on consumption ()
Coeﬃcients on initial employment state from OLS regres-
sions of employment and retirement on initial employment
state
2
Variance of complementarity between
consumption and leisure ()
Persistence in labor market status: frequencies of various
sequences of transitions
18
Parameters appearing in the job oﬀer
and involuntary separation probabili-
ties
Labor supply over the life-cycle: age-speciﬁc employment
and retirement rates
50
Mean of the complementarity parame-
ter () and age eﬀects in the job of-
fer and involuntary separation proba-
bilities
Coeﬃcients from OLS regressions of the individual-speciﬁc
numbers of transitions from unemployment to employment
and from employment to unemployment on initial employ-
ment state; Correlation between individual-speciﬁc numbers
of transition into and out of employment
3
Variance-covariance matrix of the
individual-speciﬁc unobservables in
the job oﬀer and involuntary separa-
tion probabilities (Σ
)
Coeﬃcients from OLS regressions of transitions from unem-
ployment to employment and from unemployment to retire-
ment on experience, health, UI entitlement period, region,
and age terms
30
Parameters determining eligibility for
early retirement on the grounds of dis-
ability
Coeﬃcients from OLS regressions of transitions from employ-
ment to unemployment and from employment to retirement
on experience, health, UI entitlement period, region, and age
terms
28 As above
Coeﬃcients from OLS regressions of initial employment and
initial retirement on initial experience, initial health, gender,
region, education, nationality, children, martial status, age
terms and cohort eﬀects
38
Parameters describing initial employ-
ment and initial retirement (see Ap-
pendix D)
Coeﬃcients from an OLS regression of initial wealth on ini-
tial employment, initial experience, gender, region and age
terms; Standard deviation of initial wealth
11
Parameters describing initial wealth
(see Appendix D)
Notes: In the above descriptions of regressors, “region” is an indicator of the individual residing is west Germany.
“Health” is an indicator of the individual having health problems that limit daily activities. “Gender” is an
indicator of the individual being male. “Education” refers to years of education. “Nationality” is an indicator
of the individual being a native German. “Children” and “marital status” are indicators of, respectively, the
individual having had dependent children prior to entering the sample and having been married prior to entering
the sample. “UI” is an abbreviation for Unemployment Insurance.
34D Initial Conditions
The intertemporal linkages in our model, arising from the public pension and Unemployment In-
surance systems, the endogenous accumulation of experience, and employment state dependent
job opportunities, imply that in-sample wages and employment outcomes depend on the initial
observations of experience, wages, wealth and employment status. Moreover, the presence of
persistent unobservables in wages, in preferences and in the job oﬀer and involuntary separation
probabilities renders the ﬁrst observations of experience, wages, wealth and employment status
endogenous with respect to the persistent unobservables that drive subsequent behavior. In
order to obtain consistent estimates of the structural parameters, despite the endogeneity of
the initial conditions, we proceed in the spirit of Heckman (1981). Speciﬁcally, we approximate
behavior prior to the sample period using a reduced form model in which the pre-sample en-
dogenous variables may depend on the persistent unobservables that aﬀect behavior during the
sample period. The parameters appearing in the initial conditions are estimated jointly with
the structural parameters.
In more detail, when implementing our MSM estimation method, we used a multinomial
logit model in order to simulate employment and retirement outcomes for each individual in
each quarter between leaving full-time education and entering the sample. The payoﬀs in the
multinomial logit model depend on observed individual characteristics, the quarter-speciﬁc wage,
cohort eﬀects, and the permanent unobservables that feature in preferences and in the job oﬀer
and involuntary separation probabilities. When simulating behavior prior to the sample period,
quarter-speciﬁc wages are obtained by taking draws from the distribution of oﬀered wages as
described by the structural parameters. Using the simulated pre-sample employment outcomes
and wages we are able to construct each individual’s experience, Unemployment Insurance en-
titlement period and pension points at the time when the individual enters the sample. Finally,
we simulate initial wealth by drawing from a log normal distribution with a variance σ2
Wealth
and a mean that depends on the individual’s initial experience and initial employment state,
as well as on age, gender, education and region of residence. Note that, via dependencies on
pre-sample employment behavior and wages, the simulated values of initial experience, the ini-
tial Unemployment Insurance entitlement period, initial pension points and initial wealth are
allowed to be endogenous with respect to behavior during the sample period.
Marital status and household structure prior to the individual entering the sample perform
the role of exclusion restrictions, that is variables that aﬀect the initial conditions but which,
conditional on initial behavior, do not aﬀect outcomes during the sample period. Examination
of the relevant moments reveals that the excluded variables jointly have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on
initial employment and initial retirement behavior (χ2 test; p = 0.001). Table 10 presents our
estimates of the parameters appearing in the initial conditions.




(Age   40)I(40  Age < 55)=15 -2.031 0.399
(Age   55)I(Age  55)=15 -4.990 0.830
log(gross oﬀered wage) 2.605 0.453
Permanent unobserved individual preference shifter 2.717 0.649
Permanent unobserved individual eﬀect appearing in involuntary separation prob. 0.002 0.147
Permanent unobserved individual eﬀect appearing in job oﬀer prob. -2.694 0.349
Male 0.211 1.074
West 0.109 0.693
West  Male 0.100 1.464
Education (years)/10 1.763 0.484
Year of birth  West  Male -0.443 0.534
Year of birth  West  Female 0.215 0.586
Year of birth  East  Male 0.449 1.046
Year of birth  East  Female 0.946 1.230





Previously been married  West
† -0.951 0.965
Previously been married  Male
† -0.590 0.725
Previously had children  West
† -0.226 1.255
Initial health problems -1.637 0.383
Initial Retirement
Intercept -3.374 0.267
(Age   54)I(54  Age < 58)=5 0.115 0.621
(Age   58)I(Age  58)=5 2.723 0.367
Male -0.770 0.665
West -1.283 0.408
West  Male 1.192 0.758
Year of birth  West  Male 0.516 0.651
Year of birth  West  Female 1.163 0.480
Year of birth  East  Male -1.949 3.344
Year of birth  East  Female 0.264 0.799
Initial health problems 1.901 0.385
Initial Wealth
Intercept 7.375 0.135
(Age   40)I(40  Age < 55)=10 0.969 0.168
(Age   55)I(55  Age < 60)=5 0.353 0.180
(Age   60)I(Age  60)=5 0.315 0.210
Male -0.161 0.237
West 1.156 0.155
West  Male 0.376 0.268
Education (years)/10 1.096 0.142
Initial experience 0.110 0.210
Initially employed 0.432 0.121
Wealth 1.169 0.033
Notes:
† denotes an exclusion restriction. The exclusion restrictions in the initial employment equation are
jointly signiﬁcant (
2 test; p = 0:010). “Initial health problems” is an indicator of an individual having health
problems that limit daily activities in the initial period of observation.
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Notes: “Observed” refers to a value observed in the sample while “Fitted” refers to the value of the applicable
quantity averaged over 5 simulated data sets.














Fitted -0.011 0.201 0.388 0.607 -0.076 -0.016 0.022 0.082
Observed -0.034 0.194 0.394 0.650 -0.080 -0.016 0.020 0.098
SE 0.020 0.016 0.017 0.026 0.005 0.001 0.002 0.006


















Fitted -0.096 -0.018 0.033 0.107 -0.101 -0.019 0.041 0.122
Observed -0.087 -0.017 0.034 0.121 -0.084 -0.008 0.053 0.134
SE 0.006 0.003 0.003 0.009 0.008 0.005 0.005 0.009
t-value -1.399 -0.212 -0.531 -1.497 -2.174 -1.960 -2.217 -1.361
Notes: Pj(w
∗) refers to the j
th percentile of log wages and Pj(∆
rw
∗) denotes the j
th percentile of the r
th
annual diﬀerence in log wages. “Observed” refers to a value observed in the sample while “Fitted” refers to
the value of the applicable quantity averaged over 5 simulated data sets. “SE” is the standard error of the
observed quantity (obtained via bootstrapping with clustering at the individual level) and “t-value” is the
t-value for the test of equality of the observed and ﬁtted quantities.
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